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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY1  
This study summarises the information provided by Member States in their annual 
voluntary reports on their experiences and progress concerning cooperation on fraud and 
error, as provided for in Decision H5 of the Administrative Commission for the 
Coordination of Social Security Systems. The Member States’ reports have been analysed 
with the aim of identifying several elements. First, particular attention goes to the 
definition of fraud and error in the field of social security coordination in the respective 
Member States. Secondly, the aim of the country reports was to determine the 
prevalence of fraud and error as two conceptually distinct phenomena in the Member 
States concerned. Next, insight was sought into the remaining issues associated to the 
implementation of the European coordination provisions, as a result of which fraud and 
error may arise, and the steps taken in this respect to prevent and combat fraud and 
error. Lastly, an overview was requested of the measures taken both internally and 
externally by means of bilateral agreements with other Member States, in handling fraud 
and error, as well as data protection concerns associated thereto. The report at hand 
provides an overview of these findings, allowing several conclusions to be drawn 
concerning fraud and error in the Member States in the past year.  
The report summarises the responses of 26 Member States for 2015: Austria, Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. It 
attempts to distil some general practices, particular difficulties and remaining problems. 
These insights might subsequently be used to strengthen the prevention and tackling of 
fraud and error even more in the future. Decision H5 suggests four matters to be covered 
in these annual reports: first, the steps taken throughout the year by the Member States 
to combat fraud and error; second, the specific problems connected to the 
implementation of the coordination rules which increase the risk of fraud and error; third, 
the agreements and cooperation agreements Member States conclude among each other 
for the purposes of combating fraud and error; and finally, the steps taken to motivate 
institutions and health care providers to comply with the coordination rules as well as the 
steps taken to provide information to citizens. These four issues are – as previously 
indicated – covered below. The Member States’ accounts reveal that it has proven 
somewhat difficult to detect and provide all-encompassing data concerning fraud and 
error within the realm of social security coordination. What’s more – a number of 
difficulties remain problematic in a majority of Member States when attempting to 
combat fraud and error in the field of social security coordination. These shared issues 
include, amongst others, the delayed or absent cooperation between the competent 
authorities in the respective Member States, the determination of residence, and the 
prevalence of affiliation to benefit schemes in more than one Member State for matters 
concerning unemployment benefits as well as healthcare benefits.    
Furthermore – concerning steps taken in dealing with fraud and error – the reports reveal 
that Member States focus on prevention of fraud and error as well as tackling it. 
Information dissemination towards the general public, in order to raise awareness to limit 
the occurrence of fraud and error, is vital in this respect, as demonstrated by the focus 
thereupon by Member States. In addition, information exchange with other relevant 
actors is just as important. This goes for information exchange both intrastate and 
interstate between institutions, as well as with other actors such as but not limited to 
insurance companies. Other efforts include strengthening the teams dealing with fraud 
                                                 
1 The executive summary and the introduction were inspired by last year’s report - JORENS, Y., GILLIS, D. and 
PLASSCHAERT, I., Fraud and Error in the Field of Social Security Coordination, Network Statistics FMSSFE, 
European Commission, December 2014, 55 p. 
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and error cases, providing comprehensive training for the personnel, and putting in place 
bilateral meetings between institutions. Cooperation in this respect can be formalised, for 
example by concluding a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), or non-formalised, for 
example by engaging in ad hoc meetings. 
Overall, the report reveals two broad conclusions. First and foremost, all reporting 
Member States have undertaken efforts to fight fraud and error, albeit on different levels 
or with varying intensity. These efforts repeatedly concentrate on strengthening the 
information exchange and cooperation between internal competent authorities as well as 
the competent authorities in Member States. Secondly, one of the predominant concerns 
amongst all Member States concerned relates to the delayed or absence of cooperation 
between the competent institutions of the respective Member States. In turn this results 
in scenarios – amongst others - where illegitimate double affiliation occurs and/or undue 
payments. Improvement thus remains possible and necessary – both with regard to the 
prevention and early detection of fraud and error in cross-border situations as well as 
concerning cross-border administrative cooperation and information exchange between 




1. INTRODUCTION  
Restrictions to the free movement of persons can and do appear in many different 
respects, not in the least in the field of social security, where both fraudulent and 
erroneous situations can put a strain on the free movement of persons. With respect to 
social security coordination, fraud is defined as “any act or omission to act, in order to 
obtain or receive social security benefits or to avoid obligations to pay social security 
contributions, contrary to the law of a Member State”.2 Error on the other hand is, 
according to Decision No H5,3 “an unintentional mistake or omission by officials or 
citizens”. Although both fraud and error often end up having the same effects, the capital 
difference between them is the fact that error is always unintentional.  
 
Strong cooperation between Member States is crucial in order to prevent and tackle 
fraudulent and erroneous situations in the realm of social security coordination. In order 
to boost and strengthen this cooperation, Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 on the 
coordination of social security systems4 has provided for the establishment of several 
mechanisms. The Administrative Commission is, in accordance with said Regulation, 
responsible for handling questions of interpretation concerning the Regulation’s 
provisions or concerning agreements or accords concluded in the framework of the 
Regulation. In addition to the Administrative Commission, there is a Technical 
Commission, which among other things assembles technical documents and studies; an 
Audit Board, which establishes the average costs for the reimbursement of health care 
costs in Member States; and an Advisory Committee, which is responsible for preparing 
opinions and proposals for the Administrative Commission.  
 
At the 307th meeting of the Administrative Commission, the Member States decided to 
create an Ad Hoc Group, in order to assist the Administrative Commission in its efforts to 
strengthen the cooperation between competent institutions, particularly concerning the 
combat of social security fraud and error. This Ad Hoc Group produced two reports on 
this type of fraud and error issues and identified some major problem areas. The 
conclusions and recommendations then led to Decision H5 in March 2010. As stated in 
that Decision, the Administrative Commission discusses cooperation on fraud and error 
issues once a year, based on the voluntary reporting by the Member States of 
experiences and progress in the field. It is suggested that this voluntary reporting covers 
a number of matters:  
 
 First, the steps taken throughout the year to combat fraud and error in cases 
determined under the Regulations;  
 Second, specific problems in implementing the coordination rules which may lead 
at least to risks of fraud and error;  
 Third, agreements and bilateral cooperation agreements with other EU Member 
States entered into for the purposes of combating fraud and error;  
 Finally, the steps taken, in the field of benefits in kind, to promote compliance by 
institutions and health care providers with the coordination rules and to provide 
information to citizens.  
 
                                                 
2 Resolution of the Council of 22 April 1999 on a Code of Conduct for improved cooperation between authorities 
of the Member States concerning the combating of transnational social security benefit and contribution fraud 
and undeclared work, and concerning the transnational hiring-out of workers (OJ C 125, 6.5.1999, p. 1). 
3 Decision No H5 of the Administrative Commission for the coordination of social security systems of 18 March 
2010 concerning cooperation on combating fraud and error within the framework of Council Regulation (EC) No 
883/2004 and Regulation (EC) No 987/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the coordination 
of social security systems (OJ L 149, 8.6.2010, p. 5). 
4 Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the 
coordination of social security systems (OJ L 314, 7.6.2004, p. 1). 
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This report was drawn up by firstly identifying how the various Member States have 
approached and defined fraud and error in their respective territories. In addition, an 
overview is given as to the prevalence of both fraud and error as two conceptually 
distinct phenomena; both concerning detected and undetected cases. The foregoing is 
subsequently complemented by an overview of the steps taken by the individual Member 
States in order to provide solutions to the respective problems pertaining to fraud and 
error. Subsequently, the problems associated to the implementation of the coordination 
provisions are addressed as well as the measures taken to address these issues.  To 
conclude, an overview is given of additional measures taken by Member States to 
enhance cross-border cooperation and issues that may arise in this respect with privacy 




2. IDENTIFYING FRAUD AND ERROR ACROSS MEMBER STATES 
2.1. Defining fraud and error in the field of social security 
coordination 
Any assessment of fraud and error in the field of social security coordination requires an 
assessment of these notions from a national Member State perspective. An initial step in 
this respect is ascertaining to what extent the concepts of fraud and error are effectively 
defined in national legislation in view of social security coordination – if at all – and how 
these definitions are understood in a national context. Within this context it appears that 
a number of Member States (AT, BE, BG, HR, CZ, DK, EE, FI, DE, EL, HU, IS, IE, IT, 
LV, LT, MT NL, NO, PL, PT, SK, ES, SE and UK) have not defined fraud and error in the 
field of social security coordination in legislative instruments concerning social security. 
Rather, it appears that the definitions of these concepts are derived from other sources, 
including amongst others case law, administrative practice, other legislative instruments 
or a combination of the foregoing. In the Netherlands, Slovakia, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom the notions of fraud and error are defined in the respective legislative 
instruments governing social security, albeit not specifically concerning social security 
coordination.  
In Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania and 
Spain case law and administrative practice have served as an invaluable source for 
defining what constitutes fraud and error. In Denmark in particular the different social 
benefits in the Danish social security system are to a significant extent administered 
by different competent institutions. Moreover, the specific conditions for each type of 
benefit are largely defined by private legislation. The conditions of recovery, which are 
general principles in Danish practice, however, guide the definition of fraud and error.5 
Pursuant to Article 12 (b) in the Consolidated Act on Legal Protection and 
Administration in Social Matters, which states the conditions for punishment in severe 
cases. Moreover, fraud is defined as a deliberate misrepresentation of the authority by 
the claimant that consequently inflicts loss of capital onto the authority. Generally, 
errors in Denmark are thus defined as benefit payments transferred accidentally due 
to an error made by the competent institution or by the beneficiary. Fraud is defined 
as benefits received by the beneficiary against better judgment. In Ireland fraud is 
understood as a deliberate false representation of facts whether by words or by conduct, 
by concealment of what should have been disclosed — in order to obtain or receive social 
security payments or to avoid obligations to pay contributions. Error on the other hand 
may be understood as either customer error or departmental error. Customer error 
occurs where incorrect information is provided without fraudulent intentions, whereas 
departmental error occurs due to a mistake by an act or omission by staff, which a 
customer did not cause or materially contribute to and which the customer could not at 
the time they received payment or paid contributions reasonably have been expected to 
be aware of. Similarly, in Lithuania, the concepts of fraud and error are understood to 
occur, amongst others, when incorrect information or documents are provided, or when 
an individual does not inform the competent authorities about a pertinent change of 
circumstances. Examples of fraud and error include the non-reporting of employment, 
income or social security benefits in other Member States, the non-reporting of death, 
claiming unemployment benefits whilst employed in another Member State or claiming 
the same benefit in more than one Member State, the non-reporting of the posting of 
workers or presenting incorrect documents, and lastly, fictitious employment contracts. 
                                                 
5 Specifically the conditions for recovery prescribe that both the social benefit has to have been wrongly 
received and the beneficiary has to have been acting in bad faith by, for instance, deliberately withholding 
information, in order for the competent institution to demand recovery of paid benefits.  
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The main difference between fraud and error in Lithuania subsequently hinges upon the 
fraudulent intent of the act concerned. A similar approach is employed in Austria, 
Bulgaria, Estonia, Iceland, Italy and Spain.  
In Croatia, Finland, Latvia, Norway and Portugal, the notions of fraud and error in 
social security coordination are defined by reference to other legislative instruments, not 
necessarily specifically governing social security. Fraud and error in Croatia are defined 
by criminal law as well as the Act on the System of Internal Financial Control. As a result, 
fraud and error in the realm of social security coordination is for a large part dependent 
upon a case-to-case assessment where due regard is given to the types of benefits 
tainted by fraud and/or error. In Finland reference is made to the Finnish Criminal Code 
in determining what type of behaviour and/or actions constitute fraud, aggravated fraud 
and forgery. As concerns the notion of error in Finnish legislation, reference is made to 
the Administrative Procedure Act, which regulates the concepts of material error and 
typographical errors. This approach is also applied in Latvia where fraud is defined by 
reference to the Administrative Procedure Law as well as the Criminal Code. Similarly to 
the aforementioned definitions, fraud is distinguished from error due to the fraudulent 
intent, as confirmed by the Administrative Procedure Law. The latter explains that error 
occurs due to clerical and mathematical calculation errors in an administrative act; or in 
situations where norms of law, which determine the procedure for issue of the relevant 
administrative act, have not been observed in the course of the administrative procedure 
(procedural error); or when the institution has incorrectly applied the norms of law (or 
has relied upon erroneous facts), or when it has not observed the hierarchy of the legal 
force of norms of law or has erred regarding considerations of usefulness (mistakes 
regarding substance). In Norway the Penal Code describes fraud as wilful or gross 
negligent action taken in order to obtain a benefit while the user must have realised he 
or she was not entitled to that benefit. Error, on the other hand, is described as occurring 
when payments are not completed correctly as the result of flaws in casework, negligent 
misinformation or omission of information by the users. Finally, in Portugal the notions 
of fraud and error are defined by the Basic Social Security Act, the General Tax 
Infringement Rules, the Code of Contributory Schemes and Law No 133/88 concerning 
the reimbursement of unduly paid benefits.  
As aforementioned, a number of Member States (MT, NL, SK, SE, UK) have adopted 
definitions of fraud and error in the realm of social security; moreover, the same 
definitions apply with respect to social security coordination. Slovakia defines fraud and 
error in its legislation concerning social security, i.e. Part Four of Act No 461/2003 on 
social insurance. However, it solely refers in general terms to non-compliance with or 
violation of an obligation laid down by the act or other legislation, including coordination 
regulations, i.e. committing an offence without distinction of the degree of fault. The 
exact definition of fraud and error will thus in part and somewhat similarly to the practice 
in Belgium and Poland, be determined on a case-by-case basis and with due reference to 
the benefit concerned. In Sweden fraud and error in social security are defined, albeit 
generally and not specifically related to social security coordination. Benefit fraud is 
subsequently defined as occurring when a person provides false information or does not 
report changed circumstances, thereby causing a risk that financial compensations are 
being wrongly paid or payable by a high amount. ‘Error’ on the other hand refers to all 
errors regardless of who discovered the error, if they are caused by administrators or 
recipients or whether they are accidental or unintentional. Similarly, legislation in Malta, 
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom define fraud and error within the realm of 
social security. These definitions also apply to social security coordination. In the 
Netherlands in particular, fraud is distinguished from error by reference to intent. 
Moreover, two types of error exist – claimant error and official error. In the United 
Kingdom on the other hand, fraud includes all cases where the following three 
conditions apply: the basic conditions for receipt of the benefit, or the rate of the benefit 
in payment, are not being met; the claimant can reasonably be expected to be aware of 
the effect on entitlement; the benefit stops or reduces as a result of a review. Similarly 
to the notion of error in the Netherlands, it is defined as being one of two types. Firstly, 
claimant error is defined as occurring when the claimant has provided inaccurate or 
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incomplete information, or failed to report a change in their circumstances, but there is 
no fraudulent intent on the claimant’s part. Official error on the other hand occurs when 
the benefit has been paid incorrectly due to inaction, delay or a mistaken assessment by 
the DWP, a local Authority or Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC). 
Belgian, Czech and Polish legislation employ a similar yet specific technique whereby 
distinct definitions are given to fraud and error in particular circumstances and scenarios 
and by reference to particular benefits. In Belgium for example, the notions of fraud and 
error differ depending on whether the substance of the matter concerns family benefits, 
unemployment benefits or healthcare benefits. Fraud concerning family benefits is 
defined by reference to fictitious residences and fictitious employers. These types of 
fraud are divided into seven types of fraud concerning family benefits: type A - the 
make-up of the household which is indicated in the National Register of Natural Persons 
does not tally with the real situation (false declaration); type B - false declaration of 
household income; type C – intentional non-disclosure of a situation in order to unduly 
obtain social advantages; type D – usurping the identity of another person with or 
without his or her consent; type E – fictitious activity as an employee; type F – fictitious 
employers; and type G – others. Similarly, three types of errors can be observed: type A 
– errors occasioned by the family benefit fund itself to the advantage of a recipient in 
good faith when the fund pays a sum which is different from that to which the insured 
person would normally be entitled under family benefit legislation; type B – error due to 
fraud, negligence or omission by the socially insured (undue payment is occasioned by 
this type of error); type C – errors referring to a period prior to 1 July 2014 between 
family benefit bodies that were not included in the financial envelope for global 
management or national distribution. However, fraud and error in the field of 
unemployment benefits are determined by more generalised definitions instead of by 
specific circumstances and situations. This is also the case for fraud and error concerning 
health care. As indicated, a similar approach is also applied in Polish legislation. In 
addition to distinct definitions of fraud and error encompassed in criminal and civil law, 
specific scenarios with respect to specific benefits have been identified as amounting to 
fraud and error. For example, in the field of pension benefits, fraud and error is described 
as occurring when benefits are paid despite circumstances that cause the cessation or 
suspension of the entitlement to benefits, or the withholding of benefits in whole or in 
part if the beneficiary was informed about no entitlement to benefits; when benefits are 
granted or paid on the basis of a false testimony or documents or in any other case of 
intentional misleading by the beneficiary; or when benefits are paid for reasons beyond 
reasonable control of the pension institution to a person other than the one stated in the 
decision delivered by such authority. Within this same vein, the Hungarian approach to 
defining fraud and error with respect to social security matters is two-fold. Firstly, the 
definitions will depend in part upon the particular benefits concerned – fraud in the realm 
of family benefits for example differs from the definition of fraud given in the field of old-
age benefits. In addition however, the notions of fraud and error with respect to these 
particular benefits also have differing legal bases. For example, fraud related to old-age 
benefits is determined by criminal law unless it fails to meet a given threshold. 
Furthermore, fraud concerning old-age benefits is also defined in the Taxation act, whilst 
error is described by the Act IV of 1991 on the promotion of employment and on 
unemployment benefits. This approach thus combines the technique employed in 
Belgium and Poland as well as the technique employed by the Member States discussed 
below.   
In Denmark, Greece and Romania the definition(s) of fraud and error are subject to a 
predominantly mixed regime, whereby these terms are interchangeably defined by 
reference to case law and practice, as well as other general legislative instruments. In 
Denmark for example, fraud is defined by reference to criminal law, the Consolidated 
Act on Legal Protection and Administration in Social Matters and general principles of 
law, whilst the definition of error is the product of case law and practice (see supra p. 
10). The foregoing approach is also used in Greece and Romania where fraud is also 




Sources of the Definition of Fraud and Error Member States 
Case law and administrative practice AT, BG, DK, EE, IS, IE, IT, LT, ES 
General legislative instruments (Administrative law, 
criminal law etc.) 
HR, FI, LV, NO, PT 
Social security legislation SK, SE, MT, NL, UK 
Per social security branch (via practice and/or 
legislation) 
BE, CZ, PL 
Mixed Regime DK, EL, RO 
 
2.2. Treatment of fraud  
In the large majority of Member States (AT, BE, BG, HR, CZ, DK, EE, DE, HU, IS, IE, 
IT, LV, MT, NL, NO, PL, PT, RO, SK, ES, SE, UK) fraud in the field of social security 
coordination may be subject to both criminal prosecution and administrative sanctions, 
albeit subject to varying intensity. Conversely thereto, Greek legislation and practice 
solely allows for administrative sanctions, including recovery with interest in case of fraud 
in the field of social security coordination.  
In Austria, Belgium and Portugal, the applicability of criminal law as opposed to 
administrative law, is determined by legislation, which sets forth a number of scenarios 
and/or conditions signifying whether a particular act is to be considered as administrative 
or criminal. In Austria in particular, the level of sanction from both an administrative 
and criminal perspective, will be determined by the severity of the fraud (see infra Annex 
2 - Austria). Within this context the most severe cases of fraud may lead up to 
imprisonment of 1 to 10 years.  Similarly, in Belgium the type of consequences accorded 
to fraud in the field of social security coordination on the severity of act and is distinctly 
defined in the applicable legislation (see infra Annex 2 – Belgium). Within this context 
four levels of penalties can be identified, including both administrative and criminal 
sanctioning, of which the most severe fraud can lead to imprisonment of 6 months to 
three years, a criminal maximum fee of € 33,000, and/or a maximum administrative fine 
of € 16,500.6 Also, in Portugal a number of scenarios have been described in various 
pieces of legislation, which define certain acts and omissions as giving rise to either 
criminal and/or administrative sanctioning, with a maximum fine for the most severe 
cases of fraud resulting in a fine between €5,000 and €25,000 (see infra Annex 2: 
Portugal).   
Somewhat similar to the foregoing, in Croatia and the Czech Republic, the criminal or 
administrative nature of the consequences associated to fraud are determined by the 
type of benefit concerned. In the Czech Republic the determination of criminal 
sanctioning as opposed to administrative sanctioning depends primarily upon the type of 
benefit concerned and/or whether the fraud concerns the determination of applicable 
legislation. For matters concerning the determination of applicable legislation for 
example, fraud will result in criminal consequences, whereas for residence-based benefits 
(family benefits, death grants, care allowance) no use is made of criminal law provisions. 
Rather, fraud in concerning these benefits will solely result in administrative offences. 
This is also the case in Croatia, where criminal sanction is possible for matters 
concerning pensions, family benefits and health insurance, whilst only administrative 
sanction is available for matters concerning unemployment insurance. 
In a number of other Member States (EE, HU, IS, MT, NL, UK) the predominant focus in 
combating fraud in social security coordination is on administrative law as opposed to 
                                                 
6 For the levels of administrative and criminal sanctions, cfr. AnnexII, p. 87. For a translation of the applicable 
legislation, cfr. De Coninck M., Gillis D. & Jorens Y., The Belgian Social Criminal Code. An English 
Translation by IRIS|international research institute on social fraud, Die Keure, Brugge, 2013. 
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criminal law.  In Estonia criminal prosecution and administrative sanctions may be 
administered in case of fraud in the field of social security coordination. However, for 
criminal sanctions to be administered, fraudulent intent must be explicitly demonstrated. 
Similarly, in Iceland, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom criminal sanctioning of 
fraud is predominantly reserved for the more severe cases, whilst criminal sanctioning of 
fraud occurs extremely rarely. Furthermore, Dutch legislation in particular prescribes 
that criminal prosecution is envisaged for cases if the contested amount exceeds €50,000 
or if it concerns a matter of recidivism or criminal behaviour. Hungarian legislation 
provides for both possibilities, albeit necessary to note that criminal cases pertaining to 
family benefits have yet to occur. In Malta both approaches are also possible, but the 
predominant focus remains upon the recovery of the amounts as opposed to criminal and 
(other) administrative sanctioning. 
In Germany on the other hand, in case of social security fraud the predominant focus is 
on criminal law. This is also the case in Sweden, where fraud is subject to criminal 
prosecution, albeit that no distinction is made with respect to social security coordination. 
This entails that all cases are sent to the police although not all – not inconceivably – go 
to trial. 
Interestingly, in Ireland a matrix with reference to nine characteristics is used in order 
to determine whether fraud in the field of social security coordination is to be addressed 
with criminal or administrative sanctions. These characteristics include, amongst others, 
the duration of the fraud, the amount of the overpayment, a false declaration at the time 
of the claim and failure to notify a change in circumstances affecting entitlements, and 
previous history of defrauding the Department of Social Protection. The matrix is used 
predominantly by social welfare inspectors for vetting cases and making 
recommendations for criminal prosecution. 
Treatment of Fraud Member States 
Defined (general) scenarios and distinctions in 
legislation  
AT, BE, PT 
Defined per social security branch HR, CZ 
Predominant focus on administrative sanctions EE, HU, IS, MT, NL, UK 
Predominant focus on criminal sanctions DE, SE 
Other IE 
 
2.3. The prevalence of fraud in social security coordination  
2.3.1. General observations 
In a number of Member States (AT, FI, DE, EL, IE, IT, LV, LT, MT, NO, PL, RO, SK) 
significant statistics concerning cases of detected fraud in the field of social security 
(coordination) are not available. In particular, Greece, Ireland and Norway provide 
general statistics concerning fraud, which renders it impossible to distil statistics 
concerning fraud in the field of social security coordination. Despite the lack of statistics 
it appears that in Finland7 and Lithuania8 fraud in the field of social security 
coordination is extremely limited.  
                                                 
7 Cases concerning fraud in the field of social security coordination amount to around 0.03 % of all benefits paid 
and 2/3 of these cases concern unemployment benefits. The number of cases has been stable during the last 
years. 
8 The Lithuanian report addresses an interesting phenomenon concerning possible posting fraud: The Lithuanian 
competent institution received applications to issue PD A1 documents for Polish nationals, residing in Poland 
and employed in several companies established in Lithuania. All these employees were also self-employed in 
Poland. The mentioned persons were employed in Lithuania only for a few hours a week and according to the 
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Conversely to the foregoing, statistics concerning social security fraud in the field of 
social security coordination are available in Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom. It need be noted, however, that even with respect 
to those Member States, which have such data available, the data concerned may be 
fairly limited and oftentimes solely pertains to a single benefit. In addition thereto, it 
need be noted that even with respect to the Member States, which have significant data 
available, this may be somewhat tainted as in certain examples the distinction between 
fraud and error is not made.   
2.3.2. Limited data available  
As indicated, in a number of Member States (BG, HR, DK, EE, PT, HU, IS, SE, UK), 
data is available, albeit subject to the nuance that it is limited to a certain extent. The 
limited nature of the available data can be attributed to, amongst others, the lack of 
distinction made concerning fraud in the field of social security coordination vis-à-vis 
fraud in social security generally, or alternatively the seemingly lacking prevalence of 
fraud in said Member States. Moreover, in certain Member States the determination of 
fraud has been limited to certain specific social security benefits, which in turn may be 
attributed to different authorities being competent for different types of benefits. As a 
result however, the availability of relevant data is not all encompassing.  
In particular, in Bulgaria an approximated 469 cases of fraud concerning family benefits 
have been identified, without further indications as to the types and intensity of the 
fraud. 
Concerning pensions in Croatia 13 criminal cases were identified as being potentially 
fraudulent. Other forms of fraud concerning other benefits have not been documented. 
                                                                                                                                                        
labour contracts their salary was usually less then 100 euros. These employees also applied for documents 
proving their health insurance in Lithuania. The THIF in Vilnius received 78 applications from Polish residents to 
issue E104 forms confirming that people were covered by the compulsory health insurance in Lithuania during 
the year 2014. In 2015 the THIF has turned to the Ministry of Social Security and Labour, the Labour Inspection 
and the State Tax Inspectorate with the request to investigate these cases because it considered the labour 
contracts were possibly faked) and to the Polish authorities with the request to provide information about the 
labour activities of the Polish residents concerned. Till now several investigations by labour inspectors were 
conducted, however, no infringement of labour law was established as Lithuanian Labour Code does not forbid 
employing a person only for few hours per month and there is no minimum working hours per month or per 
week established by law. Nevertheless, Lithuanian authorities suspect the main purpose of employment in 
Lithuanian is to avoid payment of social security contributions in Poland. The Lithuanian competent institution 
refuses to issue the PD A1 documents for the mentioned Polish residents on the grounds the activities in 
Lithuania being only marginal. The persons applying for the PDA1s usually appeal against the decision refusing 
the issuance of the PDA1. They argue that there is more then only marginal activity in Lithuania and that 
Lithuanian legislation is applicable. The employees do not provide information about their self-employment 
activity in Poland or state that they receive no income in Poland. Lithuanian competent institution faces 
difficulties to verify this information: on the one hand, Polish tax authorities refuse to provide information to the 
Lithuanian competent institution about the activities as self-employed by the Polish residents applying for the 
PDA1 in Lithuania and about the income of said Polish residents as there is no respective bilateral agreement. 
On the other hand, the Polish competent institution in the field of social security does not have any information 
about the activity of said Polish residents since said residents - are not registered as socially insured persons in 
Poland ! The Lithuanian competent institution has contacted the Polish competent institution regarding these 
cases and the institutions of both Member States are trying to solve this problem bilaterally. The main difficulty 
in the above mentioned situation is how to establish and prove the marginal activity in a Member State. The 
Practical guide defines marginal activities as activities that are permanent but insignificant in terms of time and 
economic return. It is suggested that, as an indicator, activities accounting for less than 5 per cent of the 
worker's regular working time and/or less than 5 per cent of his/her overall remuneration should be regarded 
as marginal activities. The question is how to compare employment activities in one Member State and self-
employment activities in other Member State when no exhaustive information about the activities as a self-
employed can be provided. Furthermore, it is not always clear how to measure e.g. working time of a self-
employed person or the 'evaluation of the activity', since the 5 per cent mentioned in the Practical guide can 




In Denmark, the National Board of Industrial Injuries receives an estimated two to three 
reported cases of fraud or punishable offences in relation to the workers’ compensation 
per year. Not inconceivably, it is assumed that the total number is higher, albeit that, 
here also, no account of the total number is available. This is so, as the compensation 
amounts are paid out by the insurance companies, who, independently of the National 
Board of Industrial Injuries, are able to report punishable offences to the police and take 
steps to recover the money on their own. Concerning pensions for former civil servants 
under the Civil Servants’ Pensions Act, fraud is extremely rare because of the extensive 
registration of pension rights by the former state employer throughout the duration of 
the employment. There have been no cases of fraud detected, reported or prosecuted by 
the Agency for Governmental Administration. Relating specifically to claimants of old-age 
pensions and anticipatory pensions from Denmark who reside outside of Denmark, a 
control unit has focused specifically on claimants of Danish pensions residing in Spain. In 
2014, the control unit reported 56 cases of recovery. It need be noted, however, that no 
distinction between fraud and error was made in this respect. The main types of fraud 
and error relate to income, residence and marital status. Finally, the Danish Labour 
Market Supplementary Pension Scheme has an estimated 20,000 pensioners abroad and 
rarely discloses cases of fraud regarding the life certificate. Moreover, the very few cases 
per year where the Danish Labour Market Supplementary Pension Fund (ATP) suspected 
fraud concerned countries outside the EU. 
Within this same vein, Estonia seems to be confronted with cases of fraud in the field of 
social security coordination only to a limited extent. However, whilst no cases were 
reported concerning unemployment insurance and social insurance generally, an 
approximated 42 cases were detected concerning inappropriate use of a valid European 
Health Insurance Card (EHIC) by a person who was no longer insured.  
In Hungary limited data is available, primarily due to the fact that actions with respect 
to family benefits have remained limited to repayment procedures. In the field of old-age 
benefits, however, 353 cases were reported, of which 157 concerned forgery; the 
majority of the remaining 196 concerned misuse of payment cards or failure to comply 
with notification obligations. 
In Iceland the Social Insurance Administration investigated 501 cases, in 226 of which 
payments were made. It need be noted, however, that in these cases no real distinction 
is made between fraud and error. 
Limited data is available in Portugal, where the Institute of Social Security investigated 
an approximated 360 cases of fraud.  
In Sweden, as aforementioned, all types of suspected cases of fraud are reported to the 
police. However, not all police reports go to trial. Throughout the past year, the Social 
Insurance Agency drew up 1,061 police reports. Most of these were terminated by the 
police, but in other cases police reports resulted in some form of sanction. Again, it need 
be recalled that no distinction is made in this respect allowing for data to be identified 
regarding fraud in social security coordination only. 
 
In the United Kingdom the following preliminary data has been gathered concerning the 
prevalence of data on cases of detected fraud. For the period 2014-2015, estimates of 
fraud and error amount to 1.9% of total expenditure, of which an approximated 0.7% is 
assumed to be attributable to fraud. This percentage, in turn, amounts to approximately 
£1.1 billion. 
2.3.3. Data available  
For Belgium, the various competent administrations provided the following information 
concerning the applicable legislation. In 2014, the National Social Security Office (NSSO) 
initiated 233 investigations in order to establish the applicable legislation. In addition, the 
Directorate-General of the Federal Public Service Social Security indicated that the social 
18 
 
inspectorate invoked Decision A1 in 150 cases (requests for information or requests with 
a view to withdraw PDs A1) between 1 January 2014 and 31 December 2014 with regard 
to the applicable legislation. Concerning family benefits, 258 cases were initiated for a 
total amount involved of € 977.144, 53. With respect to unemployment insurance, the 
competent institution (National Employment Office or NEO) noted that it keeps figures 
and statistics on ‘non-compliant situations and findings’. These are exclusively non-
compliant situations occasioned by beneficiaries. Within this context it need be noted that 
no distinction is made between non-compliant situations resulting from ‘fraud or wilful 
misconduct’ or non-compliant situations resulting from a purely material error or an 
anomaly. Mindful of the foregoing, 29, 402 cases were found to be non-compliant out of 
120, 601 effectuated investigations. Finally, with respect to healthcare insurance, the 
statistics by SECM (Service d’évaluation et de controle médicaux – Medical Assessment 
and Monitoring Service) do not allow for a distinction to be made between cross-border 
healthcare within healthcare as a whole, entailing that there are no figures as such. 
Overview Belgium  
Types of fraud Results 
Applicable Legislation  233 cases 
PDs A1  150 cases 
Family Benefits  258 cases  
Unemployment Insurance  29,402 cases  
Healthcare  No available data  
 
Concerning the determination of applicable legislation and sickness benefits in cash, no 
conclusive data exists on the detected and/or prosecuted cases of fraud in the Czech 
Republic. However, in the field of pensions limited data is available. Pensions are 
exported abroad retroactively upon presentation of a certificate. As a result there cannot 
be any overpayments with the exception of payments to Slovakia, where pensions are 
paid out on a monthly basis upon quarterly presentation of a living certificate. In the 
latter case, overpayments occur as a result of the death of beneficiaries. See the table 
below. In addition to the foregoing, an approximated 956 cases were registered 
concerning sickness benefits in kind. 
Overview Czech Republic  
 
Types of Fraud  
2014 
CZK Number of Cases 
Total payments Slovakia 
 
 Overpayments total 
 Reimbursed 
 Outstanding 
 Out of the abovementioned reimbursed 












Whilst statistics are available in the Netherlands, it is crucial to note that the data below 
only concern social security fraud, not health care fraud (see infra Annex – the 
Netherlands). 
Overview the Netherlands 
Types of fraud Results 
Applicable Legislation  698 cases 
Determination of Residence  172 cases 
Sickness Benefits in cash 1,170 cases  
Invalidity Benefits  9,499 cases  
Old-age Benefits 899 cases  
Survivors’ Benefits 127 cases 
 
The cases of fraud detected or pursued by the Spanish National Social Security Institute 
(INSS) under EU rules are shown in the table below.  Within this context, the General 
Treasury for Social Security (Tesorería General de la Seguridad Social) took action 
against two types of fraud in financial year 2014: businesses that are enrolled in the 
Spanish social security system, but post their workers to another country and should be 
subject to the legislation of the country in which they operate; and conduct detected 
involving fictitious businesses and fraudulent worker enrolments. 
 
Overview Spain  
 
Types of fraud Results 
Fictitious businesses  1,320 
Worker enrolments declared fraudulent on account of 
being fictitious  
25,182 
Businesses declared fraudulent on account of the 
posting of workers  
32 businesses 
Enrolments of posted workers declared fraudulent  335 workers 
 
2.3.4. Findings  
Clearly, as can be derived from the foregoing, the data available is somewhat 
unsystematic. As indicated, this is, in part, due to the fact that Member States approach 
the data collection of cases concerning fraud in social security (coordination) – if done at 
all – in various different manners.  
Furthermore, whilst some Member States do make a distinction between the concepts of 
fraud and error, others do not, which furthermore may taint the perception of the data 
collected. In addition, as can be derived from the Member States that do provide a 
substantial amount of data in this respect, discrepancies nevertheless persist as various 
authorities in various Member States do or don’t gather relevant data per social security 
branch. Within this vein, it appears that currently, in the Netherlands, the most extensive 
approach to data collection in this field can be identified. However, due to lacking 
uniformity in data collection in this context – insofar it is undertaken at all -, it is 
extremely difficult to decipher general tendencies with respect to fraud in social security 
coordination, as well as to determine differences and similarities in this respect, between 
Member States. Finally, a comparison with respect to previous years is, equally so, 




2.4. Data concerning cases of fraud and recoverable amounts  
As a preliminary observation, it need be noted that a majority of Member States (AT, 
BG, DK, FI, DE, EL, IS, IT, LV, LT, MT, NO, PL, PT, RO, SK) simply do not have 
specific data with respect to fraud in the area of social security (coordination).  
In Belgium, with regard to family benefits, the information requested is not available, as 
the competent institution does not break it down per period. With regard to 
unemployment insurance on the other hand, the competent institution notes the 
following: 
The type of check 
Amounts to be recovered (ascertained in 
2014) 
Declarations and conditions for granting - 
Unauthorised combination of income € 11,897,572.28 
Employment situation – checks on paid workers - 
Temporary unemployment – checks on paid workers - 
Family situation € 36,786,331.57 
 
In 2014, the NEO provided findings accounting for €139,735,910.35. This represents the 
sum of new claims and the increases in claims already ascertained. This includes a sum 
of €23,948,363 to be recovered from service voucher enterprises. After deducting this, it 
is calculated that €116,787,547 are to be recovered from recipients of unemployment 
benefits. In 2014, €34,550,416 was reimbursed voluntarily by beneficiaries. Finally, as 
regards healthcare insurance, the competent institution specifies that SECM statistics 
cannot be broken down to identify cases of cross-border health care.  
In Croatia and concerning pension benefits in particular – as no other data is available – 
the recoverable amount was estimated at HRK 4,535,447,82. Data concerning 
recoverable amounts due to fraud in the Czech Republic is limited to data concerning 
pension benefits and sickness benefits in kind. Concerning the sickness benefits in kind, 
the 956 cases resulted in a recoverable amount of €1,060,620. In Estonia, as 
aforementioned, no cases were detected concerning unemployment insurance and social 
insurance. With respect to health insurance on the other hand, the total amount was 
€16,663,61, of which five cases were brought to court. Furthermore, in some of the 
cases concerned, the Estonian Health Insurance Fund entered into extrajudicial voluntary 
agreements to facilitate payment by instalments. Recalling that the number of cases 
concerning old-age benefits amounted to 353, the recoverable amount associated thereto 
amounted to HUF 242,676,243. It need be noted, however, that this figure cannot be 
broken down by reference to various categories of fraud related to old-age benefits. 
Concerning sickness benefits, invalidity benefits and unemployment benefits in the 
Netherlands the objective is to recover 80% of the wrongfully accorded amounts within 
a timeframe of three years. Moreover, concerning family benefits the focus is on 
prevention.  
In order to facilitate the compilation of data in this respect, Spain is currently developing 
a model to combat social security fraud. The model takes a comprehensive approach 
aimed at improving the monitoring of the principal sources of fraud, prevention of fraud 
throughout the administration of social security relationships, contributions and their 
collection, early detection to avoid and correct wrongful access to social security benefits, 
and strategic planning of all of these actions, together with their constant follow-up and 
the monitoring of the results.  
Over the course of the past year, the Swedish Social Insurance Agency recovered SEK 
285 million, which generated savings of SEK 680 million. However, here also, this 
amount is not limited to coordination only. 
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In the United Kingdom, the competent authority recovered £387 million of 
administered benefit overpayments in 2014-15, of which £61.9 million was estimated to 
be due to fraud. 
2.5. Undetected fraud  
Again, in a predominant number of Member States (AT, BE, BG, HR, CZ, EE, DE, EL, 
HU, IS, IT, LV, LT, MT, PL, PT, RO, SK) no estimations have been established as to the 
cases of fraud not detected. Lastly, methodological and practical issues hinder the 
capacity to collect such data Despite the overwhelming lack of statistics in this respect 
however, it need be noted that in the Czech Republic it is nevertheless estimated that a 
significant number of cases concerning intentional double health insurance exist. 
Conversely to the foregoing, in Denmark, Ireland, Norway and to a certain extent in 
Sweden, estimations have been made as concerns undetected fraud.  
An analysis performed by an external consulting company in Denmark in 2015 
extrapolated existing data on detected cases of fraud and error in order to indicate the 
economic potential for enhanced efforts of control in the area of social security 
coordination. The analysis was limited to sickness benefits in cash, which are subject to 
coordination under Regulation (EC) No 883/2004, and welfare benefits in cash, which are 
not subject to the aforementioned social security coordination rules. Moreover, the 
estimate of undetected cases was limited to include an estimate as regards EEA citizens 
(not including Danish citizens living abroad). The analysis indicates that there are 445 
cases of fraud and error to be found concerning sickness benefits and welfare benefits 
each year. It is, however, not possible to provide data on the number of detected cases 
within the context of these 445 cases, entailing that it is also not possible to provide a 
clear estimate of the number of undetected cases. Nevertheless, the number of detected 
cases is expected to be lower than 445. 
In Ireland the Department of Social Protection has a broad-ranging and comprehensive 
control strategy, which aims to keep fraud and abuse to a minimum. A key objective of 
the Department’s control strategy is to ensure that the right person is paid the right 
amount of money at the right time. The emphasis is to minimise risks of fraud and 
eliminate incorrect payments. Where fraud is discovered appropriate sanctions apply. 
However, to prove fraud requires a careful investigation of the case, the establishment of 
the facts (often under a cautioned interview), often resulting in a disallowance of 
payment by the deciding officer and the setting up of the recovery of any overpayment in 
respect of the historical period (whenever this is possible; sometimes the evidence only 
allows the payment to be stopped from a certain date, making a full recovery of unduly 
paid amounts impossible). According to the Department, the level of overpayments 
recorded in the social welfare system is the only true measure of fraud. In 2013, the 
total overpayments recorded amounted to €127.2 million in respect of just over 84,702 
overpayments. €70.7 million was the amount recovered in 2013. The 2014 figures are 
subject to audit and are not available. Total overpayments in 2013 accounted for 0.61% 
of Departmental expenditure. Overpayments recorded as suspected fraud account for 
0.3% of total expenditure.  
As concerns Norway, an independent research institution has estimated the amount of 
undetected fraud to be an average 5% of gross payments across the six cash benefits 
most subject to fraud. The figures are encumbered with considerable uncertainty, as they 
are based on qualitative methods and analysis.  
 
The latest overall assessment of the extent of irregular payments within the welfare 
system in Sweden was made in 2010. As estimated, incorrect payments in total 
amounted to approximately 16.5 billion. The uncertainty in the estimate is however 
large. Moreover, as aforementioned, these estimations are not limited to social security 
coordination only. The method used to generate such estimations is called the “Expert 
Elicitation”. Experts analyse the existing checks, audits and investigations that are 
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available and complement its expertise in the field. Experts' individual assessments are 
then weighed together resulting in a final assessment. 
Estimations Undetected Fraud Member States 
No available estimations 
AT, BE, BG, HR, CZ, EE, DE, EL, HU, IS, IT, LV, LT, 
MT, PL, PT, RO, SK 
(Limited) available estimations DK, IE, NO, SE, NL 
 
2.6. The prevalence of error in social security coordination 
Whilst fraud – as aforementioned (see supra 2.1) – presupposes a fraudulent intent, 
error is distinguished therefrom by reference to the absence of fraudulent intent. In a 
number of Member States (AT, DK, EE, DE, EL, HU, IS, IE, IT, LV, MT, NL, PT, SK, 
SE) there is no or extremely limited data available concerning the number of cases of 
error detected in the field of social security coordination per respective branch. Again, 
this is due to various reasons. In Denmark, Iceland, Lithuania and Sweden (see 
supra) this is to be attributed to the fact that the distinction between fraud and error is 
not made in data collection. In Estonia, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal and Slovakia on the other hand, reliable data as 
such is simply not collected. Unlike the foregoing, data is available in Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Finland, Norway, Poland and the United 
Kingdom.  
2.6.1. Lacking data concerning the prevalence of error  
Despite the lacking data in a large number of Member States (AT, DK, EE, DE, EL, HU, 
IS, IE, IT, LV, MT, NL, PT, SK, SE), a number of observations need nevertheless be 
made. In Hungary data with respect to error in social security coordination is not 
available. However, it need be noted that undue payments are estimated to represent 
less than 1% of all cases concerning family benefits.  
The German statutory pensions body, the Deutsche Rentenversicherung, is unable to 
provide reliable data for reporting year 2014. Nevertheless, it is assumed that cases of 
error caused by employees or benefit recipients in cross-border situations are 
significantly more relevant than cases of fraud. In the area of insurance, the main 
problem in cross-border situations is failure to communicate multiple employments to the 
authorities in the place of residence, which leads to individuals being wrongly insured and 
to contributions not being paid. The difference compared to fraud can be seen, for 
example, in the case of seasonal workers, who are often completely unaware of their 
duty to report their multiple employments to their country of residence in order to 
receive an A1 certificate. On the benefits side, the main problems are a lack of 
information about deaths of people entitled to pensions, failure to communicate 
employment, erroneous statements about the level of any income to be taken into 
account, and – in relation to orphan pensions – failure to communicate that an education 
or training has ended prematurely. Likewise, there is no reliable data for accident 
insurance, though it is assumed that there are a significant number of people in multiple 
employments who are unknown and will not become known to the social security 
institutions. The reasons for this are usually that the individuals concerned and their 
employers are unaware of the legal provisions of the coordination Regulations, or that 
employers deliberately fail to report the situation, in order to avoid the administrative 
effort connected with a registration in the social security system of another Member 
State, when that State is responsible for the multiple employment. Lastly, no statistical 
data can be given for the area of family benefits. A frequent source of error by 
competent institutions in this respect, is the application of Article 60(3) of Regulation 
(EC) No 987/2009. The current benefit rates applicable in the Member State which has 
priority are frequently not known. As a result, incorrect benefit amounts are paid 
(sometimes to the advantage and sometimes to the disadvantage of the recipient), 
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calculated for the purpose of the provisional decision as the difference between the 
German child benefit and the expected benefit entitlement in the other Member State.  
Despite the lacking statistics on the number of cases of error in Latvia in the field of 
social security coordination per branch of social security, a number of prevalent sources 
of error have nevertheless been identified. The main types of error on the side of the 
competent institution are – similarly to Germany – the determination of a person’s death 
in the case of long-term services, errors concerning the contributions to be paid, and 
decisions taken based upon incorrect information and thus incorrectly executed. On the 
claimant’s side the main types of error are due to a lack of understanding of the situation 
and legislation and errors due to lacking attention.  
 
In Slovakia, the Social Insurance Agency has not recorded overall statistical data on the 
number of detected errors for calendar year 2014. Checks carried out in the period 
covering 2014 included the granting of invalidity pensions pursuant to the coordination 
Regulation (32 errors were found in 201 checked cases; i.e. 16 % or 1 in 6!) and 
entitlements to a Christmas allowance in relation to foreign countries (no errors were 
found). However, the Social Insurance Agency does not keep statistics with respect to 
such cases. 
2.6.2. Available data concerning the prevalence of error 
Contrary to the foregoing, a number of Member States do have some data available 
concerning the number of cases of error detected in the field of social security 
coordination.  
On the one hand, in Belgium, with respect to the applicable legislation, the emphasis is 
placed on the correct application of the legislation in the field of social security without 
deciding whether the case in question constitutes fraud or error. Often a choice is made 
in favour of rectifying the situation by invoking (or imposing) the applicable national 
legislation, which results in (retroactive) payments of social security contributions 
complying with the rules on social security. Concerning family benefits on the other hand, 
the competent authority provides that 161, 275 cases of error have been detected. 
Furthermore, regarding unemployment insurance, it need be recalled that the available 
data does not distinguish between fraud and error, which thus also renders the 
compilation of data concerning error difficult (see supra 2.3). 
Types of Error Cases 
Applicable Legislation  N/A 
Family Benefits 161, 275 cases 
Unemployment Insurance N/A 
 
The National Health Insurance Fund in Bulgaria disputed an approximated 105 claims by 
other Member States for reimbursement of costs on the ground that the individuals 
concerned were not insured in Bulgaria or that duplicate claims had surfaced. Data 
pertaining to error in other fields of social security is not available.   
Types of Error Cases 
Health Insurance 105 
 
In Croatia 276 cases concerning error were detected in the realm of pension benefits. 
However, within this number of cases no distinction has been made between error 
resulting on behalf of the claimant or, alternatively, error resulting on behalf of the 
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competent authority. Data concerning error in other fields of social security coordination 
is not available.  
Types of Error Cases 
Pension Benefits 276 
 
Error in the Czech Republic as indicated (see infra Annex – Czech Republic), is solely 
limited to error on the claimant side and does not take into consideration error on behalf 
of the competent authorities.  
Types of Error Cases 
Survivors’ Benefits 1 case 
Unemployment Benefits  17 cases 
 
In Finland during 2014, approximately 800 cases were detected where a person had 
been simultaneously insured by the respective social security legislation of two States. 
The employees concerned had typically worked in two States for two different employers, 
and were covered by the lex loci laboris principle in both States. The employees 
concerned had not, however, received double benefits nor had they acted on purpose. 
Furthermore, to minimise error on behalf of Kela, the decision-making by the 
administration is regularly monitored based on risk evaluations. Based on the results 
from such monitoring, case handlers are trained and processes are improved if needed.  
Types of Error Cases 
Simultaneous Insurance +/- 800 cases 
 
As concerns the available data for Norway (see infra Annex – Norway) the figures on 
recovered amounts are encumbered with uncertainty due to shortcomings in the 
accounting systems. Figures, which specify whether the error was on the side of the 
competent institution or on the side of the claimant, are not available. 
Types of Error Cases 
Sickness Benefits  3,912 cases 
Maternity and Paternity Benefits 1,839 cases  
Invalidity Benefits 13,410 cases  
Unemployment Benefits 10,190 cases  
Family Benefits 14,157 cases  
 
Concerning social insurance in Poland generally, no data is available on the number of 
cases of error detected in the field of social security coordination. However, as regards 
KRUS – the agricultural social insurance – there have been a number of cases of 
overpayment, which were caused by simultaneous insurance in Poland and in the other 
Member State. In particular there have been 17 cases concerning invalidity benefits, 20 
cases concerning old-age benefits and 2 cases concerning survivors’ benefits.  
Types of Error Cases 
Invalidity Benefits 17 cases 
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Old-age Benefits  20 cases  
Survivors’ Benefits 2 cases  
 
In the United Kingdom preliminary data, as previously indicated, estimates that an 
approximated 1.9% of benefit overpayments is to be attributed to fraud and error, of 
which an approximated 0.7% is due to claimant error and 0.4% due to official error. 
Despite the available percentages however, it is unclear how many cases in particular 
these figures relate to.  
2.6.3. Findings 
As was the case with respect to the prevalence of fraud, the data available is somewhat 
unmethodical. As aformentioned, this is, in part, due to the fact that Member States 
approach the data collection of cases concerning error in social security coordination – if 
done at all – in various different manners. Whereas certain Member States do attempt to 
undertake data collection in this respect, others are less focused thereupon. Again, this is 
attributable to a number of factors. Whereas some Member States do make a distinction 
between the concepts of fraud and error, others do not, which furthermore may taint the 
perception of the data collected. In addition, as can be derived from the Member States 
that do provide a substantial amount of data in this respect, discrepancies nevertheless 
persist, as various authorities in various Member States do or don’t gather relevant data 
per social security branch. Within the context of error, it appears that Norway provides 
the most extensive and thorough overview data concerning cases of error per social 
security branch. However, it is crucial to reiterate that it is extremely difficult to decipher 
general tendencies with respect to fraud in social security in view of the absent 
comparable approach by Member States to data collection in this particular field.  
2.7. Data concerning cases of error and recoverable amounts 
In view of the extremely limited number of Member States which effectively gather data 
on the cases of error detected in the field of social security coordination, it is not 
surprising that data concerning the amounts awarded in error and the amounts 
recovered are not easily ascertainable. In particular, only Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark 
and Poland report to have such data available, whilst a number of Member States (AT, 
HR, CZ, EE, DE, EL, HU, IS, IT, LT, MT, NO, PT, RO, SK) do not or do but to a limited 
extent (e.g. NL). In Lithuania in particular this is due to the fact that there is no 
possibility to determine which of the amounts claimed for recovery are related to claims 
in 2014. Moreover, it is not possible within this context to determine whether the 
amounts are to be recovered due to error or fraudulent behaviour.  
In Belgium, concerning applicable legislation, the competent social inspection services 
note that for the period between 1 January 2014 and 15 December 2014, the amount 
recorded is € 17,364,965.50, according to the investigations conducted by the social 
inspection services and the withdrawal of PDs A1, for Belgian social security contributions 
payable on a voluntary basis. It need be recalled, however, that for what concerns the 
applicable legislation it is uncertain whether this amount is to be attributed to fraud or 
error, as the distinction was not made in the compilation of this data. Between 1 January 
2014 and 15 December 2014, the amount recorded by the NSSO following investigations 
conducted by the social inspection services was €7,784,002.88 (ex officio: 
€5,793,721.60). With respect to family benefits, the competent institution FAMIFED 
specifies that it distinguishes between error and fraud. As a result no fraud due to an 
‘error’ by the socially insured (which is actually an attempt at fraud) is included in unduly 
paid amounts resulting from error. Finally, with respect to the unemployment insurance 
the recoverable amounts are indicated (see supra 2.4) albeit subject to the nuance that 
no explicit distinction has been made between fraud and error.  
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Types of Error Recoverable Amounts 
Applicable Legislation  € 17,364,965.50 
 
Similarly to Belgium, it need be noted that Danish authorities rarely distinguish between 
fraud and error when registering detected cases (see infra Annex – Denmark).  
Types of Error Recovered Amounts 
Unemployment Benefits 9,5 million 
Pre-retirement Benefits 3,9 million 
 
In Bulgaria, with respect to the amounts requested to be refunded by other Member 
States for health services, an amount of €2,264,288.17 was effectively refunded. Of this 
amount, €2,197,237.47 (97.04%) concerned benefits in kind provided to persons with a 
valid EHIC and €67,050.70 (2.96%) concerned benefits provided against valid certificates 
for registration in the Member State of residence. The persons not entitled to health 
insurance coverage due to interrupted health insurance rights did not reimburse these 
amounts to NHIF. 
Types of Error Recovered Amounts 
Health Services  €2,264,288.17 
 
Polish statistics concerning social insurance have generally not been collected. However, 
concerning KRUS, the following amounts have been recovered.  
Benefits Recovered Amounts 
Invalidity benefits € 1113.38 
Old-age benefits € 2487.15 
Survivor’s benefits € 149.55 
 
In Sweden over the course of the past year the Swedish Social Insurance Agency 
recovered 285 million SEK, which generated savings of 680 million SEK. However, it need 
be recalled – as aforementioned – that within this context no distinctions are made 
between fraud and error, and the foregoing amount is not limited to social security 
coordination. 
Finally, the competent authority in the United Kingdom recovered £1.334 billion of debt 
in 2014-2015, of which £61.9 million was due to fraud and £265.5 due to claimant error, 
a slight increase vis-à-vis 2013-2014. 
2.8. Undetected error 
2.8.1. No available estimations 
Similarly to the estimation of undetected cases of fraud, the large majority of Member 
States (AT, BG, HR, CZ, EE, DE, EL, HU, IS, IT, LV, LT, MT, NL, NO, PL, PT, RO) do 
not have estimations concerning the number of cases of error in the field of social 
security coordination. Furthermore, in view of the fact that no distinctions are made 
between fraud and error, and relevant data is not confined to social security coordination, 
no reliable data can be given with respect to error in Sweden. 
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2.8.2. Available estimations 
In Belgium, Denmark and Ireland such estimations are available, although this is 
subject to nuance. As indicated above, in Belgium for example, certain estimations are 
available for family benefits, whereas no reliable estimations are available concerning 
cases of error with respect to the applicable legislation and unemployment insurance. 
Nevertheless, concerning family benefits the competent institution (FAMIFED) specifies 
that it detects errors by monitoring the correct and uniform application of the relevant 
legislation. It therefore verifies whether the quality standards recommended are 
complied with. Via this approach, FAMIFED guarantees the efficiency and effectiveness of 
the family benefits system whilst helping to prevent error. In 2013, a certain number of 
errors were detected in a random sample of files audited at 14 family benefit funds (in 
2013). It emerged that 1.62% of undue payments which had not been accounted for 
were detected in this sample. 
As concerns Denmark a nuanced approach is also requisite. Recalling that estimations 
have been made by an external consulting company claiming that there are 445 cases of 
fraud and error to be found within sickness benefits and welfare benefits each year, it 
need be noted that this estimation does not distinguish between fraud and error. Yet 
again, this entails that no definitive data can be provided for concerning cases of error 
specifically.  
The competent Irish department carries out detailed fraud and error surveys on 
individual schemes, which provide evidence-based indicators for levels of fraud and error 
for those schemes at that particular time. ‘Fraud and Error Surveys’ have not been used 
to identify the total cost of amounts lost through fraud or error in schemes. The purpose 
and value of fraud and error surveys is to identify the exposure to risk of irregular 
payments to enable necessary improvements to be implemented. Fraud and Error 
Surveys have been used as an indicator of the level of fraud and error in schemes and 
fraud on most schemes examined is very low. Under the Compliance & Anti-Fraud 
Strategy 2014-2018, the Department of Social Protection is furthermore committed to 
undertaking at least two fraud and error surveys each year up to the end of 2017. 
Results are presented in terms of the ‘net rate of fraud and error’. The net rate refers to 
the position after account is taken of decreases in weekly rate, increases in weekly rate, 
terminations of payment, transfers to other payments and the position following appeal 
of any cases affected. The following are the results of the most recent fraud and error 
survey: 
Benefit 
Total cost of fraud and 
error  
Cost related to fraud Cost related to error 
Child benefit - 
Published 2013 
The net cost of fraud and 
error was found to be 
0.5% of expenditure 
0.5% related to 
suspected fraud 
0% related to error 
Jobseekers allowance 
– Published 2014 
The net cost of fraud and 
error was found to be 
3.1% of expenditure 
1.4% related to 
suspected fraud 
1.7% related to error 
Widow(er)’s/survivors 
and civil partners 
contributory pension – 
Published 2014 
The net cost of fraud and 
error was found to be 
0.7% of expenditure 
0.2% related to 
suspected fraud 
0.5% related to error 




The net cost of fraud and 
error was found to be 
5.0% of expenditure 
2.9% related to 
suspected fraud 
2.1% related to error 
 
2.9. Preventing and curbing fraud  
Not inconceivably, Member States have various different ways of preventing fraud and 
error in a national context not exclusively limited to social security coordination. 
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Nevertheless, certain techniques are particularly predominant across various Member 
States. In a number of Member States (BE, DK, FI, DE, IS, IE, IT, LV, NL, SE, UK) the 
techniques of data exchange, data matching and data mining are frequently used. 
Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Malta, the Netherlands and Sweden also make 
frequent use of bilateral agreements with other Member States in order to limit fraud and 
error in the field of social security coordination. 
2.9.1. Generalised findings  
As indicated above, data exchange, data matching and data mining are particularly 
popular tools in combating fraud and error. In Belgium for example, these techniques 
are used in a purely national as well as international context and serve the purpose of 
isolating inconsistencies or irregularities in social security. These methods are frequently 
adopted in combating social dumping and seek to put an end to the fraudulent posting of 
workers. To that end data matching and data mining techniques (especially in the Limosa 
database but also other databases) are to be increased. This involves making a selection 
on the basis of a risk assessment with scenarios developed and tested by 
multidisciplinary teams. Feedback from these activities will be managed in a structured 
manner so that data mining activities can be refined in an iterative process. Data 
matching is furthermore also used in the field of unemployment insurance. In casu, the 
competent institution (NEO) states that databases are cross-referenced with others 
including with other social security databases such as the databases of the NSSO, the 
National Institute for the Social Security of the Self-employed and the National Institute 
for Health and Disability Insurance (INAMI/RIZIV). Data matching is conducted in 
compliance with the principles concerning the protection of privacy and the provisions, 
which govern the electronic exchanges of personal data in the field of social law. Via the 
means of the cross-referencing of relevant databases, the NEO conducts both 
preventative checks and a posteriori checks.  
In the fields of unemployment insurance and a range of other benefits, Denmark is also 
particularly keen on the use of data matching techniques. In the field of unemployment 
benefits, members are informed that the information, which they provide to the 
Unemployment Insurance Fund, will be subject to control, amongst others by means of 
data matching. In addition, several Unemployment Insurance Funds have carried out 
information campaigns to raise awareness amongst members that the Fund concerned 
will conduct data matching through the income register in order to check the correctness 
of their respective information. Data matching is carried out in relation to data on 
income, the amount of working hours, independent business and holiday payment. 
Moreover, related specifically to claimants of old-age pensions and anticipatory pension 
from Denmark but for individuals who reside outside of Denmark, a control unit has been 
established, which focuses particularly on claimants of a Danish pension residing in 
Spain. In addition to this initiative, Denmark engages in information exchange with, 
among others, Norway and Sweden. Within this context one of the main strategies for 
the control of fraud and error in this respect is – equally so – the increased use of data 
matching.  
At a national level the Estonian authorities have developed a better exchange of data 
between different databases and are enhancing the cooperation with other national 
competent institutions. Similarly thereto, in Finland Kela envisages an increased use of 
data matching amongst various competent authorities in order to detect fraud and error 
at a far earlier stage.  
In Germany, data matching and data mining is carried out pursuant to § 119(3)(1) of 
Volume VI of the German Social Security Code (SGB VI), allowing the pensions service of 
Deutsche Post AG to regularly conduct automated cross-checking of data on deaths with 
various EU Member States and third-party countries on behalf of the Deutsche 
Rentenversicherung. In reporting period 2014, numerous comparisons took place of data 
on deaths. These covered approximately 845,700 pensions paid to various Member 
States (AT, BE, CH, ES, FI, IT, LU, NL, SE). In 2014, the sending of 820,000 life 
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certificates was rendered unnecessary because of the automated crosschecking of this 
data in place for these people. As stressed in reports in earlier years, the Deutsche 
Rentenversicherung is much in favour of, and is working hard towards, enhancing this 
cooperation. In accordance with its statutory duty under § 150(3) SGB VI, the Data 
Centre of the Pensions Institutions (Datenstelle der Träger der Rentenversicherung) 
maintains the so-called 'A1 database'. Saved in this database is data on all posting 
certificates (A1 forms) to which German regulations do not apply. Routine checks 
performed at the time the data is captured reveal errors in the certificates, which are 
then returned to the issuing authority for correction. This database is used by the audit 
authorities principally to expose cases of abuse of the posting process and to combat 
undeclared work. Under § 150(5) SGB VI, an automated data retrieval process is 
available for these purposes. The accident insurance institutions in Germany have in the 
past made efforts to agree on procedures with the liaison bodies of other Member States, 
to ensure that pension payments are made to recipients in those countries only where an 
entitlement exists. Regrettably, nearly all these procedures have come to a standstill. 
Accident insurance institutions which make payments abroad via the pensions service of 
Deutsche Post AG are going to endeavour to become included in the automatic cross-
checking of data on deaths. The remarks on the Deutsche Rentenversicherung and the 
A1 database apply equally for accident insurance.In the area of family insurance, a yearly 
comparison with data from the residence registration authorities is used to check 
whether minors still exist and are living in the household of the person drawing a child 
benefit.  
Lastly, the Irish Department of Social Protection’s emphasis is to minimise risks of fraud 
and eliminate incorrect payments, which is achieved amongst others, by means of data 
matching and mining techniques. This involves appropriate checks at the point of 
claiming, strengthened by systematic reviews of claims in payment and verification that 
the conditions for entitlement continue to be met, including means, residency and 
medical reviews. The Department of Social Protection has an extensive legal structure to 
support the sharing of data for the purpose of controlling the entitlement and payment of 
benefits. The legislative provisions that allow for the specific sharing of data are 
contained in section 261(1) of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005. Information 
held by the Department (Minister) for the purposes of the Act (including the purpose of 
collection by the Revenue Commissioners of employment and self-employment 
contributions) may be transferred by the Department to the Revenue Commissioners. 
Similarly, information held by the Revenue Commissioners for the purposes of this Act or 
the Income Tax Acts, relating to employers, the reckonable earnings of employed 
contributors or reckonable income or reckonable emoluments of self-employed 
contributors or of any payments made under this Act may be transferred by the Revenue 
Commissioners to the Minister. Under the provisions of section 261(2) information held 
by the Department (Minister) for the purposes of this Act or the control of schemes 
administered by or on behalf of the Minister or the Department of Social Protection may 
be transferred by the Minister to a Department or a specified body. The inverse also 
applies. The Department undertakes a number of existing data matches with other 
Government Departments and Agencies on a systematic basis, including with the Irish 
Prison Service, Third Level Institutions, the General Register Office, the Commission on 
Taxi Regulation, Revenue Commissioners, the Department of Work and Pensions (UK) 
and the Probate Office. The Department recognises that fraud investigation and control 
can be assisted through the application of a range of new technologies. Within this 
context, the Department recently commenced a project utilising analytics technology to 
predict which claims are more likely to be fraudulent. When this technology is in place, it 
is hoped that this will enable the Department to target higher risk cases for investigation 
and to do so faster. Existing customer information will be used to build analytics models 
which will enhance fraud and error detection. 
Finally, as concerns cooperation techniques regarding data at a national level seeking to 
combat fraud and error, mentioned need be made of the plethora of national data 
exchange agreements that have been enacted in Latvia with this exact purpose, as 
indicated below.   
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Data exchange agreements in Latvia 
 Agreement on cooperation between the State Social Insurance Agency (SSIA) and the State Medical 
Commission for the Assessment of Health Condition and Working Ability (16.04.2007).  
 Agreement on cooperation between the SSIA and the State Medical Commission for the Assessment of 
Health Condition and Working Ability on the exchange of information via the state portal 
http://www.Latvija.lv  e-services (15.12.2014).  
 Agreement between the SSIA and the Constitution Protection Bureau on the exchange of information (the 
CPB) (15.04.2008). 
 Agreement between the SSIA and the Ministry of Defence on the exchange of information (09.06.2008).  
 Agreement between the SSIA and the Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs on supplying of information 
to the SSIA in online data transmission regime (27.02.2009).  
 Agreement between the SSIA and the Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs on the use of the software 
package “Personal Data Database” of the Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs (14.04.2009).  
 Agreement between the SSIA and the Ministry of Education and Science (28.10.2009).  
 Agreement between the SSIA and the Information Centre of the Ministry of the Interior (07.07. 2010).  
 Agreement between the SSIA and the State Revenue Service (02.08.2011).  
 Agreement between on cooperation between the SSIA and the State Employment Agency (18.01.2012).  
 Agreement on cooperation between the SSIA and the State Labour Inspectorate on data exchange of the 
act of accident at work (05.08.2013).  
 Agreement between the SSIA and the Administration of the Maintenance Guarantee Fund on exchange of 
data using the state information system (13.10.2013).  
 Agreement between the SSIA and the National Health Service on supplying of information (08.04.2015).  
 
In addition to the frequent use of data matching and data mining, life certificates are 
often used to facilitate the fight against fraud and error in the particular field of social 
security coordination. In particular Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Norway make use 
of such certificates.9 Regarding the Danish Labour Market Supplementary Pension 
Scheme specifically, pensioners residing abroad have to fill in a life certificate once a year 
in order to continue receiving supplementary pension. Furthermore, the Finnish Centre 
for Pensions exchanges life certificates electronically with Sweden and Norway. 
Changes to the living conditions deduced from life certificates are forwarded to the 
Finnish pension providers in order to save costs in pension handling and to avoid long-
term excess payments of pension. Exchanges of information concerning deaths with 
Germany and Spain are also under negotiations. Not entirely like the foregoing, yet 
nevertheless noteworthy – in Hungary steps have been taken to automate the transfer 
of mortality data on a national level and steps have been taken to conclude bilateral 
agreements in this respect.  
As previously indicated, bilateral agreements covering various topics such as life 
certificates and data exchange, have furthermore proven to be very fruitful in combating 
fraud and error. In Croatia a number of data exchange (bilateral) agreements have 
either been established or are being prepared. Such bilateral agreements have already 
been concluded with Slovenia and Montenegro and negotiations are underway with 
Germany, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia. In Malta a data exchange agreement was 
negotiated with the United Kingdom, as a large share of the Maltese pensions are paid 
in the UK.  
 
Furthermore, in addition to the bilateral agreements between Finland, Norway and 
Sweden concerning the use of life certificates, mention need be made of the joint 
information campaign between Estonia and Finland. In 2014 Finland and Estonia 
organised a joint campaign called “You should not pay double”. The objective of the latter 
was to inform workers moving between the two countries of their respective social rights 
and obligations with an emphasis on the applicable legislation and the avoidance of 
double insurance. 
 
A particularly noteworthy initiative in the context of bilateral and multilateral cooperation 
concerns a Danish initiative. Denmark has enhanced its efforts of combatting fraud and 
                                                 
9 Recall in this respect that the use of data matching and data mining have rendered the use of life certificates 
in Germany unnecessary.  
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error under the Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 coordination rules by establishing a central 
unit for international administrative cooperation in 2014 under the auspices of Udbetaling 
Danmark, which is the competent institution for a range of social benefits, such as family 
benefits, maternity benefits and old-age pensions. The central unit works to establish 
close relations with other Member States as well as with countries outside the EEA area, 
aiming at enhancing cooperation and information exchange. A central task of the unit is 
to examine the possibilities of concluding bilateral agreements with other Member States, 
aiming at information exchange on a larger scale. In addition, the unit facilitates 
information exchange between the Danish municipalities and other Member States in 
concrete cases under the administration of the municipalities. These initiatives relate to a 
range of different social benefits – e.g. family benefits and sickness benefits – 
administered by different central and local national authorities. Hence, the unit also 
contributes to strengthening cooperation and coordination across different national 
authorities. The central unit is closely connected to a newly established section dedicated 
to working with data and data matching (see supra) as part of the strengthened efforts 
of combatting fraud and error. By matching data from various public registers, the data 
section is able to identify patterns of fraud and is therefore able to identify possible cases 
of fraud and error, which are forwarded to the competent institutions for further 
inspection. This section, hence, also contributes to strengthening cooperation and 
coordination across different national authorities. In the initial phase, the data section 
focused on data matching on the basis of Danish public registers, which has accordingly 
resulted in a focus on national cases of fraud and error. However, there have been 
examples of cross-border cases that have been detected using the data-matching tool. In 
order for the data-matching tool to be effective in detecting cross-border cases of fraud 
and error, the data unit is, nevertheless, dependent on access to data from other 
Member States’ registers. In the long term, it is therefore the ambition, in cooperation 
with the central unit for international administrative cooperation, to conclude bilateral 
agreements on information exchange with other Member States’ competent institutions. 
The current data matching system is based on experience with patterns of fraud, but for 
the purpose of the stepped up efforts, it is the ambition to increase the use of statistical 
data analyses.  
 
2.9.2. Overview of additional Member State initiatives  
Clearly, as can be derived from the foregoing, the varying initiatives taken by the various 
competent authorities in the respective Member States are not to be regarded as 
conceptually distinct and isolated from each other. The establishment of the Danish 
central unit (see supra p. 30) for administrative cooperation for example, serves as an 
umbrella facilitating cooperation from a bilateral perspective with varying other (Member) 
States, as well as the effective and enhanced use of data matching and data mining on a 
national scale, but equally so on an international scale. Mindful of the foregoing, an 
overview follows of the various additional and individual initiatives taken by the Member 
States.  
In 2014, Austrian Social Security began building up specialised competence in 
combating fraud at both national and international levels. The current fact-finding 
exercise was taken as the basis for laying the foundations of a common anti-fraud 
strategy and standard guidelines for fraud monitoring. Furthermore, there was an 
increased focus on the possibilities of computer-assisted risk analysis, particularly on the 
employer side, to enable suspicious cases to be identified early on and targeted 
verification systems introduced. 
In addition to the use of data matching and mining, since 2014 Belgium provides for the 
Checkin@work application at construction sites. It registers all persons working on sites 
(Act of 08 December 2013 amending Article 30bis of the Act of 27 June 1969 and the Act 
of 04 April 1996) in order to prevent fraud and to make other data available for data 
mining. Also in the construction sector, QR codes are provided for in compulsory LIMOSA 
documents in order to make it easier to register foreign employees and self-employed 
workers at construction sites and the two sides of the construction industry have agreed 
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upon photo identification for all construction workers (albeit that the latter was 
accomplished without a distinct legal basis). In addition, the new State Secretary for the 
Fight against Social Fraud has set up (round table) meetings with all the stakeholders in 
the construction and transport sector to discuss possible measures and possible 
cooperation in order to combat fraud more effectively. Concerning family benefits a 
number of initiatives have been taken, including amongst others, the establishment of an 
electronic flow system for authentic sources coordinated by the Crossroads Bank for 
Social Security was developed so that each of these IPSSs which grant social benefits 
depending on the socio-professional situation of the socially insured may automatically 
have the information they require to manage the file correctly. Each IPSS may thus be 
authorised by the Social Security Sectoral Committee to benefit from access, free of 
charge, to the data, which are relevant to it and are legally justified. In addition, with 
respect to family benefits, for the purpose of preventing error and fraud, FAMIFED 
developed and introduced the Register of Family Benefits (Cadastre des allocations 
familiales / Kadaster van de kinderbijslag) in July 2004. This tool registers all family 
benefit files with all the beneficiary children, the recipients of family benefits and the 
contributors whom the rights to the benefits stem from. This register permits a flow of 
electronic data and is a tool, which streamlines administration and helps to combat family 
benefit fraud. It rejects any attempt to encode a double payment for the same 
beneficiary child for the same period and is therefore a tool for preventing a certain 
number of errors and (attempts at) fraud. 
In Bulgaria the National Revenue Agency undertakes measures to prevent and combat 
fraud by strict verification of the conditions for the issuance of A1 certificates, by use of 
electronic means and the statistical data available, by providing forms for applications 
online and by incorporating relevant changes and adaptations in national insurance 
legislation.  
Croatia has implemented a plethora of measures to combat and prevent fraud and error 
in the field of social security coordination. In particular use is made of regularly updated 
databases in the field of pensions. Moreover, such databases are used to facilitate 
cooperation between the competent Croatian authorities. The foregoing has been 
complemented with data exchange agreements between said authorities. Furthermore, 
and in addition to the aforementioned bilateral agreements (see supra), since March 
2014 an agreement on electronic data exchange on the occurrence of death has been 
concluded and a three-year obligatory medical check-up has been imposed with respect 
to pension benefits and fraud within the respective field.  
In the Czech Republic focus has been on the composition and conclusion of internal 
regulations for the competent authorities and their respective staff members, in 
conjunction with vocational training of said employees and a system of controls. 
Furthermore, use is made of regularly updated databases as well as a centralised system 
for the purpose of determining the applicable legislation. In order to handle the 
difficulties arising in the determination of residence, a questionnaire has been established 
which may facilitate an easier determination thereof.  
In addition to the initiatives in Denmark concerning data matching and mining as well as 
the use of life certificates and bilateral agreements, an additional initiative intended to 
curb fraud and error need be mentioned. Regarding lump sums paid to 
spouses/cohabitants and children under 21 upon a member’s death under the Danish 
Labour Market Supplementary Pension Scheme, the relatives must make a claim for the 
lump sum, if the deceased member resided outside Denmark or if the surviving relatives 
reside outside Denmark. Within this context, a surviving spouse must send a marriage 
certificate, and confirm that they have not divorced.  
In Estonia the data of electronically transmitted invoices from health care providers are 
automatically verified (electronic invoices must meet the size/format of the shipment, 
which is approved in contract for financing medical treatment between the health care 
providers and EHIF).  
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Complementing the Finnish use of data matching and mining as well as bilateral 
agreements, insurance numbers are exchanged electronically with Sweden, Norway 
and Germany. The Finnish Centre for Pensions also has access to the German EAO 
service, which includes German insurance history periods and the amounts of pensions. 
Secure e-mail connections with Estonia and Sweden are established (Finnish Centre for 
Pensions) and negotiations for establishing secure e-mail connections with other Nordic 
pension institutions are on-going. The Finnish Centre for Pensions also registers all of the 
PDs A1 received from the other Member States. The Employees Pensions Act entitles the 
authorities to gain access to information which can be used in the fight against fraudulent 
behaviour as well as erroneous situations. This access to information functions between 
for example the tax authorities and the authorities in charge of social security 
coordination in Finland. The act also enables the authorities to grant access to 
information in order to solve offences or irregularities (Sections 198, 199 and 200). 
A number of initiatives to prevent fraud and error have also been taken in Greece. 
Firstly, fraud related issues may be reported, anonymously or otherwise, to the Financial 
Police Directorate, by telephoning 11012 or sending an email to 11012@hellenicpolice.gr. 
In addition to the foregoing and by virtue of the ARIADNE programme (Law No 4144/13), 
information is shared between the databases of all the Greek social security bodies, 
under the responsibility of IDIKA Α.Ε. (eGovernment Social Security), and the TAXIS 
database (the electronic system used by the tax offices – DOY), so that changes in 
pensioners’ personal situations (marriages, deaths, divorces) are detected in good time 
so they can be immediately deleted from the social security bodies’ files where 
appropriate. Based on the data from ARIADNE, a whole series of actions are carried out 
to prevent infringements. Specifically, upon notification of a death, payment of pensions 
and other benefits and allowances by the social security body or bodies is immediately 
suspended. Furthermore, these benefits can no longer be collected by non-beneficiaries, 
the use of the deceased’s insurance booklets is cancelled, ensuring that they cannot be 
used by third parties, and significant financial losses to the EOPYY (National Organisation 
for Healthcare Provision) are avoided. The DOY (tax offices) are immediately informed of 
the death and assess the new situation from a tax point of view and also in terms of the 
assets register. Similarly, upon notification of a marriage (or registered partnership), 
insurance benefits to those who were considered as dependants are suspended, 
assistance to persons who are no longer beneficiaries is suspended, and 
widow’s/widower’s benefits are suspended following remarriage. Finally, upon notification 
of divorce, insurance cover of non-dependants and payment of family benefits are 
suspended. Complementing the foregoing initiatives, the ILIOS (Integrated Control 
System for Payment of Pensions) was established, electronically connecting 93 different 
pension payment systems, which support the disbursement of 4,407,288 (main, 
supplementary and other) pensions to 2,714,034 pensioners. ARIADNE interconnects 
with ILIOS, to enable greater use of computerised cross-referencing. Finally, a National 
Register of Pensions and Pensioners was established through the ILIOS system, the 
database of which is already being used by social security bodies to address and detect 
abuse. In the field of tackling contribution evasion and contribution avoidance, the Social 
Security Debt Collection Centre (KEAO) was created within IKA-ETAM (Law 
No 4172/2013). The purpose of the KEAO is to establish uniform procedures and 
mechanisms for the timely collection of debts and arrears owed to social security 
organisations, with the aim of improving the sustainability of the social security system. 
It is the first step within a broader reform that aims to integrate the revenue collected by 
the social security bodies into the tax administration system and merge the procedures 
for collecting taxes and social insurance debt by 1 July 2017. Setting up this Centre is 
expected to resolve problems, which, in the past, rendered the recovery procedure and 
enforced recovery measures complex and time-consuming, preventing the social security 
bodies from collecting their projected revenues. Lastly, the Sample-based Audit 
Department has been established within the Directorate for Incomes Policy of the State 
General Accounting Office, which is the pension institution for former civil servants. The 
main purpose of this department is to carry out external audits on interdepartmental 
discrepancies, but also to carry out sample-based audits on acts issued by the 
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Directorate for Regulation and the Directorate for Pension Payment Orders (Article 5 of 
Law No 4002/2011). 
In Ireland, the Public Services Card (PSC) is furthermore provided for to enable citizens 
to gain access to public services more efficiently and with a minimum of duplication of 
effort, while at the same time preserving their privacy to the maximum extent possible. 
The PSC is designed to replace other cards used by the Department of Social Protection 
such as the free travel pass and the Department’s social services card, and to make it 
easy for providers of public services to verify the identity of persons. Towards the end of 
April 2015, a total of 1.34 million cards were produced, including just below 700,000 
PSCs produced in 2014. The PSC also provides a higher and enhanced level of assurance 
as to identity and it therefore acts as a key tool in the prevention and detection of 
identity fraud. Taken in conjunction with the face-to-face registration process, the new 
PSC seeks to offer significant new protection against welfare fraud. To strengthen the 
PSC registration process, the Department uses facial image matching software to help 
detect and deter duplicate registrations. During the course of the registration process, 
the software performs a search of the captured or imported customer photograph against 
existing photographs on the Department’s database to ensure that the individual has not 
already been registered for a PSC using a different PPS number, or a different identity 
dataset. Where a match or a potential match is found, it is referred for further 
investigation.  
In addition to the use of data matching and data mining, Italy has established a specific 
procedure in order to manage the phenomenon of fraud, to archive cases of fraud and to 
analyse said data for the purpose of conducting risk analyses. Furthermore, a 
memorandum of understanding has been established with the Finance Guard for the 
prosecution of offences in social assistance, pensions and social security contributions.  
In tackling fraud and error in Lithuania, information about social security coordination 
rules and about the use of the EHIC is published on the web pages of the competent 
institutions. This information is updated on a regular basis. In addition, information 
concerning social security coordination is consistently disseminated by means of different 
mass communication measures, information pamphlets and brochures. Upon the granting 
of benefits in accordance with the coordination Regulations, experts of the competent 
institutions verify the information provided in SEDs, PDs, E forms or other documents. 
The documents are consistently verified to ensure that they are properly filled out and 
signed. In the event of suspicion concerning the credibility of the information presented, 
the relevant EU Member State competent institution is contacted. Lithuanian competent 
institutions also verify information about the employer made available by different 
registers and other institution databases (e.g. tax authorities information, the register of 
Lithuanian residents). Lastly, meetings are organised with competent institutions and 
experts to discuss individual cases and to share best practises.  
Complementing the Maltese agreement with the UK concerning data exchange, IT 
infrastructure in the field of social security has become interconnected with that of other 
entities allowing for enhanced cooperation between the various national authorities and 
institutions. In addition, verification of the identification of foreign nationals has been 
enhanced, entailing that original pieces of identification are now required.  
In the Netherlands a plethora of measures have been taken to prevent fraud and error 
on a national level. In particular – concerning sickness benefits, invalidity benefits and 
unemployment benefits, preventative measures have been taken, as well as control and 
compliance measures and corrections and sanctions. The preventative measures include 
promoting and maintaining risk and fraud awareness of employees by organising training 
programmes and protocols for staff, verification of the identity of clients, administrative 
keys (Civil Service Number) and DigID (pin-code for services provided by the whole of 
the public sector), and informing clients properly on their rights and obligations, including 
mass media campaigns in cooperation with the Department of Social Affairs and other 
organisations. The control and compliance measures include administrative and electronic 
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controls, entailing data comparisons and exchange when applying for a benefit as well as 
electronic payment controls. In addition thereto, such control and compliance measures 
encompass statistical means of risk profiling, risk management and risk targeting in 
combination with checklists for front-office officials such as work-coaches, doctors and 
intermediaries. Lastly, as concerns corrections and sanction measures, recovery of 
unjustly claimed benefits is employed as well as the use of fines and possibly criminal 
prosecution.   
Prevention of fraud and error in Norway is currently ascertained by manual measures 
established as compulsory checks, which are instituted in key operations by case 
handlers before the benefits are paid out. These measures are undertaken in the 
processing of the cash benefits most subject to fraud and error, such as sick leave 
benefits and single parent benefits. In addition, red flag documents have been identified 
for some of the most fraud-prone benefits as a means to support case officers in their 
daily handling of cases. 
It is noteworthy to mention the legislative amendments made in Portugal in order to 
promote the coordination of various databases and the promotion thereof vis-à-vis 
various competent authorities. In addition, Law No 15/2012 established an Information 
System for Death Certificates.  
In Poland a number of initiatives have been taken to prevent fraud and error, albeit 
limited to pensions. These measures include identity verification allowed by access to the 
PESEL register (the Polish PIN), the adjustment of the insurance database and benefits 
database, the adjustment of data from various benefits databases and enhanced 
verification of the correctness of cases by the regional offices (concerning KRUS). 
In Romania the following initiatives have been taken as part of the fight against fraud 
and error:  
Prevention of fraud and error in Romania 
 Efficient cooperation with national institutions responsible for combating fraud and error in the field of 
social security.  
 Efficient cooperation with institutions from other Member States responsible for combating frauds and error 
in the field of social security, and with other competent institutions in the enforcement of the European 
coordination Regulations of social security systems (especially with those from Belgium, Germany, France 
and the Netherlands).  
 Regular exchange of databases between the national institutions responsible for combating fraud and error 
in the field of social security: the National Pension Office, the National Health Insurance Office, the National 
Agency for Employment, the Labour Inspection, the National Tax Administration Agency/Territorial Tax 
Agencies and the Ministry of the Interior).  
 Provision of databases related to PDs A 1 issued by the CNPP to CLEISS. 
 
Equally so, a number of initiatives have been taken in Slovakia. As a measure to 
prevent fraud and error in the field of pensions, two specific employees deal with cases 
which have a cross-border dimension. Firstly – an officer (referent) and secondly, an 
individual who approves the work completed by the former (aprobant). These are 
subsequently checked – on an interim basis – by the competent managers and the 
methodology unit for pension insurance. The amount of the pension is determined 
automatically by software wherever possible. Furthermore, in proceedings concerning 
pensions, the Social Insurance Agency cooperates with the institutions of other States 
that are parties to the EEA Agreement and with Switzerland, and with other Slovak 
national authorities. It also cooperates in the reporting of the death of pension recipients, 
changes of address and other income. During 2014, the Social Insurance Agency carried 
out checks in accordance with Section 242 of Act No 461/2003 and was obliged to 
remedy the deficiencies identified by these checks and the causes of such deficiencies, 
and to take disciplinary action against the responsible employees. With respect to 
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sickness and maternity benefits, the Social Insurance Agency accepts – for the purpose 
of claims for certain sickness benefits – domestic certificates of a treating physician 
issued in another EU Member State. In order to prevent fraud and error, the competent 
institutions of the Member States have been asked to provide the domestic documents 
used for verification of sickness and maternity cash benefits. Unfortunately, not all 
Member States responded to the Social Insurance Agency’s request. It need be noted 
that the most effective cooperation with the Social Insurance Agency has been with its 
partner institution in the Czech Republic. If an insured person files a claim using 
documents for which the Social Insurance Agency does not have a sample, the Social 
Insurance Agency asks the competent institution in the Member State in which the 
treating physician issued the submitted certificate to verify whether the submitted 
documents are admissible for a claim for sickness and maternity cash benefits. The Social 
Insurance Agency assesses the claim for a sickness benefit only after receiving a positive 
response from the competent institution. Lastly, concerning family benefits, databases 
have been installed which seek to warn for potential errors and pair data to avoid errors 
in the payment of benefits and facilitate cooperation between institutions. As a result, a 
single officer can now manage the registration and assessment of all social benefits for 
an individual family. 
3. IMPLEMENTING THE COORDINATION PROVISIONS  
3.1. Issues pursuant to the implementation of the coordination 
provisions 
3.1.1. Prevalent issues 
A number of issues can be identified as a result of the implementation of the coordination 
rules in the field of social security amongst the various Member States. Grosso modo 
three issues in particular can be identified which are directly related to the 
implementation of the aforementioned rules. Firstly, lacking and/or delayed exchange of 
information between the competent institutions has proven to be a significant obstacle in 
the implementation of said rules and may lead to an increase of fraud and error in a large 
number of Member States (BE, BG, HR, DK, EE, FI, EL, IS, IE, LV, NL, PL, PT, RO, 
SK, ES). As a result thereof, issues arise such as intentional double health insurance, as 
well as scenarios whereby individuals are receiving unemployment benefits in one State 
whilst being gainfully engaged in a second Member State. This can also result in incorrect 
payments being made and/or social insurance contributions being paid to the wrong 
institutions as indicated by Ireland, as well as the payment of pensions despite the 
claimant already being deceased as noted by Croatia. In Iceland the lacking or difficult 
cooperation is considered as particularly cumbersome in case of changes in 
circumstances, which are not or not in a timely fashion notified to the competent 
authority.  
Secondly, lacking individual awareness with respect to the applicable rules in a cross-
border context and the rights and obligations associated thereto, has also proven to 
significantly hinder the effective implementation of the coordination rules in certain 
Member States (FI, DE, ES) thereby increasing the risk of fraud and error. As has been 
indicated, however, and as will be elaborated upon below (see infra), a large majority of 
Member States have acknowledged the necessity of updated information dissemination 
via a number of platforms.  
Lastly, the identification of an individual’s residence has proven to be an arduous task 
(CZ, EL, HU, IT, LV, MT, NO, PL, PT). This can in part be attributed to the fact that 
free movement has increased as a result of the steps taken to facilitate this. For now, 
however, the difficulty in determining a place of residence may ultimately negatively 
affect the prevalence of fraud and error. In Lithuania and Slovakia it appears that, 




Prevalent Issues Member States 
Lacking/delayed information exchange 
BE, BG, HR, DK, EE, FI, EL, IS, IE, LV, NL, PL, PT, RO, 
SK, ES 
Lacking awareness of rights and obligations  FI, DE, ES 
Identification of Residence CZ, EL, HU, IT, LV, MT, NO, PL, PT 
No Significant Issues LT, SK 
 
3.1.2. Overview of Member State-specific issues  
In addition to the foregoing overarching issues observed in a number of Member States, 
a number of issues have been noted which are specific to a particular Member State. In 
what follows, an overview will be given of these issues.  
The competent Belgian institutions specify that in some cases it remains difficult to 
rapidly verify findings/doubts as to the applicable legislation (conditions) in the host 
Member State with the data available to the posting Member State. Moreover, employers 
acting in bad faith exploit this weakness and/or lack of transparency (e.g. by organising 
insolvency). As regards family benefits, the competent institution (FAMIFED) specifies 
that the problems it encounters with the European coordination rules arise in the 
exchange of information with European institutions with which it has not signed an 
agreement on combatting social fraud in general and which have very restrictive 
standards governing private data. Lastly, concerning unemployment insurance in 
Belgium, it need be noted that the U1 form is not always completed with sufficient 
accuracy or does not offer any response to all the questions raised by the National 
Employment Office (NEO) in order to establish the right to unemployment allowances. It 
is important, for example, for the NEO to know whether a specific person has been 
working full-time or part-time, exactly how many hours were worked, how much the 
person was paid, what the type of employment contract was and under what 
circumstances it was terminated. Dismayingly, a substantial amount of time may pass 
before the competent foreign body replies to the questions raised in order to verify or 
authenticate certain forms, or to certain requests for information. 
A particular issue arising in the Czech Republic is the lacking uniformity in the 
interpretation of certain terms within the context of the coordination provisions. It 
suffices for example to refer to the notion of parental leave, which is subject to some 
discussion as to the exact meaning. As a result of the lacking homogeneity in the 
definition concerned, uncertainty may potentially lead to fraud and/or error.  
In Denmark the degree of registered problems specifically related to the implementation 
of the coordination rules remains limited. The National Board of Industrial Injuries 
nevertheless reports that the most frequently occurring problem in respect of the 
application of the coordination rules is when work in Denmark is performed under the 
pretence of posting or self-employment. This may result in erroneous decisions to the 
effect that an injured person is not covered by social protection in Denmark and is thus 
not entitled to compensation. Udbetaling Danmark reports that limitations on information 
sharing – as is the case in Belgium – constitute the primary barrier in combatting fraud 
and error. 
 
Generally, it can be held that the problems associated to the implementation of the 
coordination rules have - thus far - remained rather limited in Estonia. It appears that 
double entitlement remains an issue in that individuals apply for unemployment benefits 
whilst still being employed in another Member State. As previously indicated this is in 
part attributable to the delay and/or absent cooperation between the Member States’ 




Similarly to Belgium, Denmark and Estonia, the Social Insurance Institution of Finland 
(Kela) notes that the main problems are associated to the difficulties in obtaining 
necessary information for determining whether there is entitlement to a given benefit, 
which again, is attributable to the aforementioned lacking or delayed cooperation 
between the requisite authorities.   
 
Pursuant to German practice, it appears that the rules on the determination of which 
legislation is applicable (Article 11 et seq of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004) are prone to 
error. Working out which legislation applies concerning an individual in a cross-border 
setting depends on a multitude of factors. The different possible scenarios are described 
in the regulations; however, statements of circumstances can be manipulated or relevant 
facts covered up. It appears that the options available to control these factors effectively, 
are limited. If, for example, statements concerning the substantial business activity of a 
self-employed person who pursues several business activities in different Member States 
need to be checked in the Member State of residence, the question arises as to what 
means are available to the institution for doing so. Whether a business activity is still 
being carried out is often relatively simple to establish or prove via the registered trade. 
However, the question whether this activity is substantial, within the meaning of 
Article 14(8) of Regulation (EC) No 987/2009, in the country of residence at the time of 
posting requires more extensive examination. The need for a sophisticated examination 
as such, inherently carries a greater risk of manipulation and error. Another example 
concerns the prohibition to replace another posted person (Article 12(1) of Regulation 
(EC) No 883/2004), which can scarcely be effectively monitored in large businesses. It 
need also be noted that the rules governing the applicable legislation inevitably lag 
behind new forms of employment that surface, thus entailing that there is a discrepancy 
between legislative provisions and factual reality. It tends to take too long to make 
amendments reflecting such new developments due to time-consuming coordination 
processes. In the area of family benefits, sources of error and risk arise particularly in 
cases of subordinate competence under the coordination rules, in particular due to a lack 
of knowledge of the conditions for and levels of family benefits in the Member State 
whose legislation has priority. Lastly, in the Administrative Commission's last EHIC 
questionnaire the DVKA (German liaison body for health insurance abroad), attached to 
the GKV-Spitzenverband (German national association of statutory health insurance 
funds), pointed out the non-acceptance of the EHIC in some regions of the EU when 
individuals avail themselves to services in another EU country – of which certain 'tourist 
centres' are typical examples. 
In Hungary mention is made of difficulties surrounding the determination of the 
applicable legislation in addition to the aforementioned issue concerning the 
determination of residence concerning pension benefits.  
As indicated, delayed and/or lacking cooperation between Member State authorities 
render it difficult to adequately implement the coordination provisions and facilitate fraud 
and error. In Italy a particular result of this issue is the fact that unemployment benefits 
are paid whilst the person concerned is nevertheless gainfully employed elsewhere. This 
is further aggravated due to the fact that there is no structured system which counters 
this tendency. In addition to the foregoing, Italy notes that lacking or incomplete 
information with respect to family benefits renders it extremely difficult to determine 
entitlement thereto, which is not inconceivably to the detriment of the claimant.  
 
The difficulties encountered in Latvia with the implementation of the coordination rules 
are numerous. In addition to the aforementioned issues pertaining to Member State 
cooperation and the determination of residence, particular issues arise with respect to 
double contributions, linguistic discrepancies, paid social services to deceased persons 
and problems to recover them from the foreign banks, and lastly, the lack of information 
on a person’s employment in another Member State in order to determine the rights to 
the social service payments. However, the issues concerning double contributions, and 
double insurance as well as incorrect and/or delayed mortality information are in part to 




As previously indicated, the Netherlands report that it often proves to be difficult to 
fully understand the organisational structure and competence of the partner institutions 
in other Member States and to find the right contact person at the competent institution. 
In addition, linguistic issues have been noted as detrimentally affecting the 
implementation of the coordination rules as well as diverging data protection legislation 
in the respective Member States. Concerning family benefits in particular, artificial 
agreements within the context of posting have been noted as being detrimental, whilst 
inappropriate use of the EHIC in border regions has been noted as troublesome 
concerning cross-border healthcare.  
 
In addition to the issues concerning the determination of residence particularly in the 
field of atypical employment, the Norwegian Health Economics Administration has noted 
that in the field of benefits in kind, issues have arisen as well. It appears that technical 
challenges have arisen in relation to the issuing of healthcare rights determined under 
the EU social security coordination provisions. The challenges are mainly linked to the 
EHIC and the fact that the EHIC can at present only be issued for a period of three years, 
regardless of the expected period of insurance. This may increase the risk of fraud and 
error. However, thus far no cases of fraud and error in this field have been detected.    
 
Polish practice, in line with the foregoing, has illuminated a number of irregularities and 
issues in the implementation of the coordination rules as well. Concerning pension 
benefits, it appears that there is a failure to provide the requisite data for the 
identification of individuals, a lack of contact information in social insurance institutions, 
a lack of information about the death of persons entitled to benefits, resulting  
in overpayment of benefits, a lack of information about changes of address/place of 
residence (also of tax service and health insurance contributions), a lack of information 
about circumstances that determine the entitlement to and  
the amount of the benefit (e.g. foreign income, continuation of employment, non-
exhaustion of the benefit period), national regulations or practice preventing the return 
of benefits transferred to the bank account of individuals entitled to benefits after their 
death, a lack of information on entities entitled in a given Member State to authenticate 
signatures as well as to authenticate submitted copies of documents as true  
to the original – most of which are attributable to lacking or delayed cooperation between 
the aforementioned institutions. It appears that – concerning health insurance – there 
have been cases where individuals received benefits on grounds of a valid EHIC, but were 
then subsequently excluded from the insurance retroactively. Furthermore, there 
seemingly is a problem associated with the use of Decision S6 and in particular the 
cancellation of the entitlement. Lastly, certain incidents have erroneously been 
recognised as accidents at work in the territory of Germany. From May 2004 until the 
end of the first quarter of 2015, out of 33,827 forms E125 DE containing recognised 
claims of the German institution in the scope of accidents at work  (DGUV), 21,481 
claims did not relate to benefits in kind unrelated to an accident at work or an 
occupational disease. In these cases the benefits related to an accident at work were 
granted on the basis of forms E111, the EHIC or certificates replacing the EHIC issued by 
the Polish institution at the request of the German institution. Examples provided by the 
Polish competent institutions indicate that the main reason for the expenses were 
patients’ visits to clinics or hospitals due to illness, injuries sustained in a place of 
residence or accidents during time off work and non-working life of the person whose 
form E125 was concerned. In 80 cases, the Polish institutions did not issue an 
authorisation document requested by the German side for individuals receiving the 
benefits within the territory of Germany. These were, in fact, people uninsured in Poland, 
mostly working in Germany. 
 
Slovakian practice has not encountered any significant issues. In the field of sickness 
and maternity, the main problem felt by the Social Insurance Agency is the prevalent 
lacking effective communication with other institutions and the lack of familiarity with 
national documents. As regards the applicable legislation, the Social Insurance Agency 
has encountered a problem within the field of posting of workers, whereby atypical forms 
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of employment and bogus self-employment are used as a means to circumvent the rules 
on the prohibition of replacing posted workers. Lastly, in the field of family benefits, the 
aforementioned lack of effective cooperation and data sharing with other (Member State) 
institutions, as well as the lacking support for institutions from courts and police forces in 
connection with benefit fraud are significant issues. 
 
In Spain, the administration of the right to benefits in kind continues to be problematic 
due to the aforementioned significant delays in communication with other institutions, 
which gives rise to fraud and error. Such anomalies are also caused by non-compliance 
by the insured individuals themselves, when they fail to communicate changes in their 
personal and/or family circumstances, for example a change of residence, in a timely 
manner, as required by paragraph 3 of Article 76(4) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. 
This practice is further aggravated by the fact that no financial repercussions are 
applicable to individuals not complying with the aforementioned obligations, whereas this 
is the case for both the competent institutions and the authorities in the place of 
residence. In addition, it appears that there are some issues concerning U1 forms issued 
in France, which has subsequently resulted in individuals being able to draw 
unemployment benefits in more than one State.  
 
Unlike other Member States, Austria additionally notes problems and issues related to 
the application of the relevant legislation, and misuse of the EHIC. In Sweden on the 
other hand, it appears that the main concern is related to the fact that individuals are 
negligent in notifying relevant changes of circumstances.  
 
Finally, in Lithuania it appears that no issues have arisen.  
 
3.2. Measures directed at preventing and curbing fraud and error 
pursuant to the coordination provisions 
3.2.1. Prevalent initiatives 
As can be derived from the foregoing, numerous issues persist in the application of the 
coordination rules enshrined in the EU social security coordination Regulations. 
Consequently, it need not surprise that a myriad of initiatives have been taken in order 
to combat fraud and error as a result thereof.  
In particular, a number of Member States have increased and enhanced training of 
employees in the respective competent authorities and communication concerning fraud 
and error in the field of social security coordination (BE, CZ, FI, LV, NL, PL, PT). 
Complementing the foregoing, a number of Member States (BG, DK, EE, FI, EL, IE, LV, 
NO, RO, ES) (see infra) have invested in greater awareness-raising and information 
dissemination not only amongst their employees but equally so with respect to their 
claimants. In Portugal such training sessions are particularly noteworthy. Three sessions 
were organised in 2014, each of a duration of two days, which covered the 18 institute of 
Social Security district centres and involved a total of 255 staff members.  
In conjunction therewith, Member States are increasingly making use of bilateral 
agreements between each other or have taken steps to facilitate such bilateral 
agreements (BE, DK, IE, IT, LV, MT, NL, NO, PL, PT, RO, UK). 
Initiatives Concerning Coordination-related 
Issues 
Member States 
Training and awareness-raising of employees BE, CZ, FI, LV, NL, PL, PT 
Training and awareness-raising of claimants BG, DK, EE, FI, EL, IE, LV, NO, RO, ES 




3.2.2. Overview of Member State-specific initiatives 
In addition to the foregoing, a number of Member State-specific initiatives are 
noteworthy as indicated in what follows.  
Special measures have been taken in Austria to prevent fraudulent claiming of the 
Austrian compensatory pension supplement, which is a special non-contributory benefit 
listed in Annex X to Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 and thus payable only to persons 
resident in Austria. Presenting a registration certificate is insufficient to prove permanent, 
regular residence in Austria. The pension insurance institutions apply strict checks both 
with regard to applications and to continued payment of the compensatory supplement. 
In suspect cases, i.e. where there is reason to believe that the pensioner does not 
permanently reside in Austria, a questionnaire must be completed routinely; income is 
verified via the competent authorities; the applicants are summoned to the pension 
insurance establishment and questioned about the income they declared to the residence 
authorities; and the authorities check whether sickness insurance benefits have been 
claimed in Austria (if they have not been for an extended period, this could indicate that 
the person is not resident in Austria). Also, if a telephone call is received from the 
applicant, the dialling code is checked to ascertain whether the call was made from 
abroad and if the suspicion that the pensioner does not live in Austria increases, 
payments are discontinued immediately. Furthermore, measures have been introduced 
by the 4th Social Law Amendment Act 2009, entailing that persons with pension 
entitlement are responsible for proving that their usual place of residence is in Austria 
and insurance institutions are authorised to switch to cash payment of benefits. 
Furthermore, in such cases the pension insurance institution must request re-notification 
of the essential information pertaining to the claim for compensatory supplement at least 
once a year (instead of every three years). Lastly, the pension insurance institutions 
were also called upon by the Federal Ministry for Labour, Social Affairs and Consumer 
Protection, as the supervisory authority, to monitor trends among these categories of 
persons. Any apparent irregularities are to be reported to the Ministry to enable further 
measures to be taken against abuse. 
In Belgium – in addition to the foregoing – in 2014 an operational plan was established 
to fight cross-border fraud by the competent institution for unemployment insurance. 
Also within the field of unemployment insurance, it need be noted that the presidency of 
the Benelux Working Group on ‘Benefit Fraud’ has been entrusted to the NEO, the 
competent institution in Belgium for unemployment insurance. 
In Croatia new legislative provisions have been implemented by the new Pension 
Insurance Act, which are intended to reduce the risk of fraud and error, including 
amongst others mandatory re-examination in case of disability entitlement.  
As previously indicated, in Denmark a unit for international administrative cooperation 
has been established with the aim, amongst others, to ameliorate and facilitate enhanced 
cooperation with institutions in other Member States and support the forging of bilateral 
agreements.  
Awareness-raising with respect to the rights and obligations associated with social 
security coordination has become a focal point in Finland. This is attained in part via 
dissemination of relevant information on the respective and pertinent websites. This 
awareness-raising initiative was furthermore complemented by a joint awareness-raising 
campaign – via television channels, newspapers etc – in Finland and Estonia, which 
required cooperation between the social security authorities in both States, as well as the 
labour unions and the pension insurance companies.  
In Germany the initiatives taken to curb fraud and error have resulted in the recording 
of A1 documents in an A1 database to which audit authorities have access for matters 
concerning statutory pensions and accident insurance. In addition, as concerns family 
42 
 
benefits in the realm of social security coordination, specialised case handlers will be 
responsible for handling such claims.  
Greek practice has resulted in the obligation to provide annual life certificates to avoid 
erroneous payment of pensions to individuals who have deceased.  
In Ireland, efforts are continuously made to establish contact points with Member States 
and the anonymous reporting of cases of fraud has been facilitated.  
A number of initiatives have been identified in Latvia. The main steps to combat fraud 
and error in 2014 were the attempt to enhance the effective exchange of information 
between competent institutions, the use of data techniques to fill out e-documents, the 
use of annual life certificates (similarly to Greece) and an increased use of bilateral 
agreements with other Member States. Furthermore, Latvia has focused on, as 
aforementioned, training individuals with respect to the EU coordination Regulations and 
has - via the Internet - raised citizens’ awareness concerning their rights and obligations. 
A notable measure in Malta is the establishment of a fully-fledged inspectorate branch 
within the Ministry for the Family and Social Solidarity for the purpose of identifying 
cases of fraud and performing necessary investigations in this respect.  
In the Netherlands, as aforementioned, a plethora of initiatives and measures have 
been taken aimed at the prevention, control and detection as well as the correction and 
sanctioning of fraud and error in the field of social security coordination (see supra p. 34-
35) 
The focus in Norway has predominantly been on the increased exchange of data with 
the Nordic states concerning registered deaths on a regular basis.  
In Poland in the area of pensions, action has been taken to introduce electronic 
exchange of information about deaths in order to ensure that pensions are no longer paid 
to individuals who have deceased. Within this context cooperation is underway with 
Germany and Australia as well as with the Netherlands, the UK, Spain, Italy and Croatia. 
Furthermore information has been obtained with respect to, amongst others, the national 
legislation concerning the recovery of benefits from foreign bank accounts following a 
beneficiary’s death, on entities authorised to verify signatures and certificates of life in a 
given Member State and on bilateral agreements executed by EU/EFTA Member States, 
providing for aggregation of the insurance periods completed in third countries by 
persons concerned. In addition, several cross-area initiatives have been taken, including 
direct meetings with representatives of liaison bodies and appropriate EU/EFTA Member 
States in the scope of social security, exchange of information concerning changes in 
Polish legislation, changes in institutional structure, procedural questions as well as the 
appointment of contact persons in each institution for the purpose of making enquiries as 
to the coordination of social security systems, and inspections conducted by a liaison 
body in competent institutions in order to eliminate errors and fraud in the field of social 
security. 
In addition to the bilateral agreements in posting, as well as the training sessions 
generally, Portuguese practice has come to include inspections carried out by a given 
national authority in association and in collaboration with different authorities. This has 
effectively led to criminal investigations, which thus serve to limit and reduce the cases 
of fraud and error in social security coordination.  
In Romania, a network of experts has been established responsible for the combating of 
fraud and error in the field of social security. In addition, attempts have been made to 
enhance cooperation with national institutions responsible for combating fraud and error 
in the field of social security, as well as cooperation with institutions from other Member 
States responsible for combating fraud and errors in the field of the social security 
Regulations – in particular Belgium, Germany, France and the Netherlands. Lastly, 
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regular exchange of database information between the national institutions responsible 
for combating fraud and error in the field of social security has been facilitated.  
In Spain, meetings are held with liaison bodies of various States (CH, BE, NL, SE, NO, 
DK, FI and PL) to establish and draft agreements for the exchange of information to help 
in the monitoring of deaths, top-up benefits and health cover.  
In Estonia, Iceland and Sweden no specific steps have been taken over the course of 
the past year.  
3.3. Promoting compliance by institutions and healthcare providers 
in the field of benefits in kind and awareness-raising amongst 
citizens 
In Belgium, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Poland, Slovakia and Sweden no noteworthy 
steps have been taken to promote compliance with the coordination provisions by 
healthcare providers nor have measures been taken to provide information to citizens 
concerning benefits in kind. Conversely, a number of Member States (BG, HR, CZ, DK, 
EE, FI, DE, EL, IE, LV, LT, MT, NL, NO, PT, RO, ES, UK) have indeed taken measures 
to promote compliance in the field of benefits in kind by institutions and healthcare 
providers with the EU social security coordination rules and to provide information to 
citizens, and this via the means of extensive awareness raising (see supra “Measures 
directed at preventing and curbing fraud and error pursuant to the coordination 
provisions”). Within this context, various Member States (AT, BG, DK, EE, FI, EL, IE, 
LV, NL, NO, RO, ES, UK) have directed measures at the users of the social security 
coordination rules, or in other words, the EU citizens to whom the rules apply. On the 
other hand, various Member States (BG, HR, CZ, FI, DE, IE, LV, LT, MT, NO, PT, RO, 
UK) have taken steps specifically directed at the provider of benefits.  
3.3.1. Awareness-raising directed at claimants 
Concerning the former category of initiatives directed specifically at the users, the 
following initiatives have been taken. The National Health Insurance Fund in Bulgaria 
organises periodic media campaigns for the particular purpose of further elaborating 
upon the rights and obligations inherent to the health insurance services. Regarding 
information to citizens concerning the EHIC and the coverage of cost under the EHIC, an 
intensive information campaign was launched in Denmark in 2014. The reasoning for 
this was the repeal of the Danish public tourist health insurance as of 1 August 2014. The 
campaign was conducted by use of different platforms such as a campaign website, 
television spots, street events, posters in streetscape, leaflets and information on social 
media. Similarly, in Greece the dissemination of pertinent information for users of the 
coordination rules and in particular healthcare in a cross-border context, is posted on the 
websites of the main social security bodies and of the EOPYY. Also in Latvia awareness 
raising is accomplished in a similar manner. Information for citizens is available on the 
official Internet website of the competent institution. Furthermore, information can be 
obtained by calling the customer call centre. Informative campaigns specifically related to 
cross-border health care issues have not been performed during 2014. However, in some 
informative activities on health care issues, information has been provided about cross-
border health care (type of activities: participation in seminars concerning health care; 
publications in newspapers; television news; usually such activities are initiated by other 
interested parties (journalists, other governmental institutions, associations, NGOs etc.)). 
Lastly, in Austria, the Netherlands, Norway, Romania and Spain use is also made of 
the Internet, mass media and leaflets/brochures in order to provide citizens with up to 
date and correct information regarding their rights and obligations under the social 
security coordination rules. In both Member States information regarding rights is 
provided to citizens through different channels such as the Internet, social media as well 
as the national contact point.  
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In Estonia the Unemployment Insurance Fund raises awareness amongst the public 
mostly by means of the internet and the relevant websites. With respect to the 
transposition of the Directive on Patients’ Rights and previous legislation, a questionnaire 
to hospitals was furthermore prepared, which is to be completed by foreign patients in 
order to clarify which rules apply to the patient concerned. 
The Finnish Kela provides information for public health care providers on its webpages 
concerning healthcare for foreigners. Kela also provides information for health care 
providers in the private sector, pharmacies and insurance companies. Furthermore, in 
2014 Kela trained its personnel as well as the health care sector within the context of 
social security coordination. Within this same vein, several internal instructions have 
been improved. In addition, Kela has been preparing a new data system concerning 
rights to health care in cross-border situations. The system will comprise for example 
information about the forms issued to a person and his or her entitlements to health 
care. The system will also promote compliance with the rules as well as offering accurate 
information for customers. The estimated launch of the new system will be in March 
2016. Kela's Centre for International Affairs was established on 1 January 2014. Most 
international affairs are centralised there, which also promotes compliance with the rules. 
Lastly, the national contact point for cross-border healthcare within Kela provides 
information on issues related to situations where people go from Finland to another 
country or come to Finland from another country in order to obtain healthcare. This 
contact point is preparing a new website together with other authorities to provide 
information in Finnish, Swedish and English about the use of healthcare services in 
Finland and abroad. The estimated launch of the website will be in September 2015.  
Citizens granted entitlement from Ireland are forwarded information when they are 
issued the EHIC. This information advises them on their responsibility if they are no 
longer resident or insured in Ireland. The processing of reimbursement claims from other 
Member States promptly leads to withdrawal of entitlement documents where a person is 
no longer insured in Ireland. This ensures that the Irish Health Service Executive does 
not have to meet additional costs insofar Ireland is not competent. 
3.3.2. Awareness-raising directed at providers  
In addition to the foregoing initiatives directed at the citizens, a number of Member 
States (HR, CZ, FI, DE, IE, LV, LT, MT, NO, RO) have (also) implemented measures to 
ensure greater compliance from the perspective of the providers of social security 
benefits. As aforementioned, Croatia and Finland provide information directed at 
healthcare providers and the private sector via their respective websites. The foregoing is 
also done by the biggest health insurance company in the Czech Republic. Identically, 
in Germany compliance is promoted via the means of online information targeted 
specifically at service providers for the purpose, amongst others, of preventing fraud and 
error. In addition, case handlers at the statutory accident insurance institutions regularly 
attend professional training seminars where they receive expert advice on the prevention 
of fraud and error.  
The Irish Health Service Executive, which is the competent institution for benefits in 
kind, has greater interaction with institutions in other Member States. This cooperation 
greatly assists in resolving issues in determining matters such as, amongst others, 
eligibility and residency. The Health Service Executive has a central contact for 
institutions in other Member States to facilitate the issuing of temporary replacement 
certificates. This is where a person requires an entitlement document urgently. This 
ensures the person has not to meet the cost, but is provided with care under regulations. 
This email contact also gives the opportunity for institutions in other Member States to 
correspond electronically with local health offices in Ireland. Not only does this provide a 
central contact point for citizens; it also leads to uniformity in the application process and 
in responding to other Member States on outcomes. The Health Service Executive, in its 
obligation to confirm and record information on entitlement documents, has updated all 
healthcare providers on what is required to facilitate the reimbursement from other 
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Member States. This ensures that all relevant information is available to claim from the 
institution in the competent State. 
In order to strengthen proper application of the EU social security cooperation rules, in 
Latvia the competent institution – responsible for the provision of state-funded health 
care services – provides daily support to healthcare providers by means of, amongst 
others, consulting health care providers on specific issues and distributing informative 
leaflets.  
In Lithuania, the contract between a healthcare provider and the THIF simply obliges 
the healthcare provider to comply with the provisions of the coordination Regulations 
when providing healthcare services. As is done to provide pertinent information to 
citizens, the Norwegian Health Economics Administration provides information, in 
addition to arranged meetings and guidelines, to institutions and healthcare providers via 
different channels such the internet, social media and the national contact point, in order 
to promote compliance with the coordination rules.  
Maltese practice provides for regular in-house training and online and/or telephone 
support concerning the interpretation and application of the coordination provisions.  
Initiatives in the Netherlands aimed at the service providers include, amongst others, 
dissemination of relevant information directed at the providers concerned via the 
internet. Similarly to the practice in the Netherlands, the dissemination of updated 
information in Portugal is achieved via the internet in conjunction with circulars 
disseminated by the Ministry of Health. 
Regarding the benefits in kind, the National Health Insurance Office in Romania, as a 
liaison body, has submitted through its competent bodies, namely the health insurance 
offices, information necessary for the implementation of EU regulations, directed at both 
the insured persons as well the healthcare providers. Similarly to the practice in Norway, 
the dissemination of relevant information is achieved by means of, amongst others, the 
Internet, meetings at the level of competent institutions and mass media. 
3.4. Remaining issues 
In a large number of Member States (AT, BE, BG, FI, DE, IE, LV, NO, PL, ES) certain 
matters that have not been discussed do remain unresolved, despite the laudable steps 
taken to prevent issues as such. 
Austrian Social Security finds the incidence of and potential for circumvention under the 
applicable legislation particularly problematic. The problems in this area have been raised 
in numerous notes and expert reports within the Administrative Commission over the 
past few years, and are currently being discussed in more detail in the 'Posting' Working 
Group.  
As regards applicable legislation in Belgium, the competent institutions note that the 
conditional withdrawal of PDs A1 by the competent foreign institutions remains 
problematic as well as the final payment of social security contributions in the correct 
social security scheme and cross-border recovery. Additionally, the implementation of 
direct recovery between the competent social security bodies of undue social security 
contributions (in the posting Member State) also remains problematic. Lastly, 
discrepancies between what constitutes fraud and error in the Member States concerned 
render cooperation more difficult. 
In Bulgaria a practical problem has been observed. It appears that there is a lacking 
willingness to treat patients that are insured outside of Bulgaria. This is further 
aggravated by the fact that there is no efficient means to verify this observed reluctance 
to treat patients as such.  
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The Finnish Centre for Pensions finds the payment of contributions to different Member 
States particularly difficult. Some employees have lost their jobs or are simply not hired 
due to the fact that the employers do not want to bother with foreign payments. This is 
considered as an impediment to the free movement of workers. Furthermore, the 
retroactive cases that need correction consistently cause problems and despite the 
initiatives taken to curb long handling times per case, this nevertheless persists as a 
distinct issue.  
Accident insurance institutions in Germany have limited competence in performing 
controls and checks in companies with the aim of preventing abuse of the system in the 
form of illegal employment, improper application of the provisions on which legislation is 
applicable, and undeclared work.  
Notwithstanding that it has been mentioned repeatedly, in Ireland, note is made of the 
fact that more immediate and electronic transfers of case-by-case information requests 
from and to all organisations is necessary. The existing systems are constrained by time 
delays and an inefficient use of resources. Moreover, clarification from social security 
organisations on what investigations and enquiries can legitimately be undertaken by 
them for social security organisations having regard to their national and EU legislation 
would help. Lastly, there is a need to ensure that all cross-jurisdictional outcomes are 
collated and recorded to measure the effectiveness of ongoing co-operation.  
With an increasing move towards electronic service delivery, e-fraud is an emergent risk 
variable that will require consideration by all organisations. 
In Latvia three distinct remaining issues can be identified. Firstly, the Office of 
Citizenship and Migration Affairs does not maintain data on persons’ departure outside of 
Latvia, and therefore the competent institution of Latvia (the State Social Insurance 
Agency) does not have this information. As a result, it is not possible to apply the 
bilateral agreement between pension institutions of Latvia and Lithuania on the exchange 
of information on the death of pension receivers or their departure to another country as 
effectively as it should. Secondly, an agreement between pension institutions of Latvia 
and Estonia on the exchange of information on pension receivers in electronic form has 
still not been concluded. Lastly, the pension receivers living abroad are not satisfied with 
the situation that they annually have to submit life certificates for further pension 
payment.  
Norway has experienced problematic cases in the field of benefits in kind whereby an 
individual sent a Norwegian healthcare provider a copy of the EHIC after the treatment 
has taken place, whereas the EHIC (and the insurance period of the person) 
subsequently turned out to have started after the treatment took place. In such cases 
the individual concerned should have paid for the benefits in kind and not been given 
rights following the rules in the EU social security coordination.  
In Poland issues persist in the field of pensions. Specific sources of concern are 
inconsistent rules concerning the recovery of pensions from a bank account following a 
beneficiary’s death, and problems with the retrieval of benefits from some EU/EFTA 
Member States. In addition, the lack of access to pertinent registers renders it impossible 
to get assistance from certain Member States with respect to the deaths of unshared 
customers. As a result, use need still be made of hard-copy life certificates.  
In Spain, the difficulties persist of determining the habitual residence of pensioners in a 
State other than the competent State. Within this context and in view of the many 
tourists and residents, pensioners and/or their relatives frequently stay in Spain for long 
periods of time, claiming that they are staying only temporarily and with no interest in 
formally becoming habitual residents. Furthermore, Article 11 of Regulation (EC) 
No 987/2009 stipulates that once an overall assessment has been made of an individual's 
circumstances, if there is disagreement between the institutions, it is the individual’s 
intention that always prevails for the purpose of determining the habitual residence in a 
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State other than the competent State. In casu, this can thus lead to or increase the risk 
of defrauding the presumed competent State and also has serious implications for the 
country where these individuals are staying, theoretically, on a temporary basis. The 
country the individual is 'visiting' is subject to an excessive demand for benefits in kind, 
often related to chronic and pre-existing illnesses, which it is obliged under the current 
provisions of Decision S3 to provide, but which would in practice be more in keeping with 
habitual residence, given the regularity with which insured individuals require them. This 
all has significant repercussions for the planning of health services, as these individuals – 
oftentimes pensioners – cannot be included as actual residents, even though in practice 
the frequency and type of health care they require is more in keeping with a supposition 
of habitual residence. 
Conversely to the foregoing, in Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Romania and Slovakia no (significant) new issues have been identified. 
3.5. Recommendations 
For the purpose of resolving issues concerning the applicable legislation, Belgium 
proposes to make increased use of Decision A1. Concerning family benefits, the 
competent institution notes that meetings between counterpart European institutions are 
required to draw up agreements on combatting social security fraud and errors. The aim 
of these agreements should be to define a legal framework for transparent cooperation 
and effective information processing. 
Estonia notes that increased use of electronic data exchange would facilitate enhanced 
and more effective cooperation, thereby minimising the potential for fraud and error.  
From the Finnish perspective, it is noted that a key proactive resolution could be to 
reach employers and employees and give them adequate information as early as 
possible, allowing for their respective social security matters to be dealt with in advance. 
As a suggestion to resolve this issue, easy access to information on how to pay 
contributions should be provided. For example, a joint website could be created which 
has information on all the Member States and their contribution collection practices or EU 
webpages on practical guidelines. Concerning the cases that need correction afterwards, 
the Regulations could for example provide means to reimburse social security 
contributions between the Member States’ competent institutions, as the coordination 
rules require Member States to determine the applicable legislation as well. Lastly, 
regarding the avoidance of long handling times, it is noted that a workable solution could 
be to consider time limits for providing answers to requests for information.  
In addition to the foregoing, Greece notes the possibility of converting the personal 
identification number (PIN) provided for in Article 52(3) of Regulation (EC) No 987/2009 
into a pan-European number, with integrated use and recognition by all EU social security 
bodies and, of course, registration in a single computerised database. 
4. DATA EXCHANGE IN THE FIELD OF FRAUD AND ERROR 
4.1. Actions taken and measures implemented to enhance cross-
border cooperation and information exchange  
In what follows a schematic overview is provided, elaborating, per Member State, upon 
measures taken to enhance cross-border cooperation which have not already been 
elaborated upon in addition to the bilateral agreements that have been concluded in the 
context of data exchange.  
Member States Initiatives 
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Austria  Actions 
 Establishment of a national 'fraud and error' contact point: the Austrian 
contact point was set up in consultation with the Federal Ministry for 
Labour, Social Affairs and Consumer Protection at the Central 
Association of Austrian Social Insurance Institutions (Hauptverband der 
österreichischen Sozialversicherungsträger). The insurance institutions 
and other public authority stakeholders were given comprehensive 
information about the tasks and possibilities of the H5NCP network and 
encouraged to make active use of it. 
 Active participation by Austrian Social Security in the following working 
groups and projects: 
o The Administrative Commission Ad-Hoc Group on 'Combating 
Fraud and Error through the Exchange of Personal Data', 
Brussels; 
o The Conference on 'International exchange of data on deaths', 
Cologne; 
o Participation in Ghent University's project 'Red Flags! 
Prevention, Detection and Cooperation in the Fight Against 
Cross-Border Social Fraud'; 
 Participation in the 'European Working Group on Benefit Fraud', Dublin. 
Bilateral agreements 
 Agreement with Germany on combating undeclared work: In 2012, at 
the initiative of the Finance Administration, Austria and Germany 
entered into an agreement on cooperation in combating cross-border 
undeclared work and illegal cross-border hiring of labour. The 
agreement provides for better bilateral cooperation. 
 Electronic exchange of data on deaths via Deutsche Post's pensions 
service: on the basis of an agreement with Deutsche Post's 
Rentenservice, data on deaths is exchanged between the Austrian 
pensions insurance institute and the German DRV Bund (pension fund).  
 Electronic exchange of data on pension amounts with the German 
statutory pension insurance scheme (Deutsche Rentenversicherung) via 
the Worldwide Exchange of Social Security Information (WESSI) system 
developed by the Austrian social security institutions. The basis is an 
agreement between the Austrian pension insurance institution and the 
German DRV Bund. 
Belgium Actions 
 As regards applicable legislation, the competent institutions list the 
following activities and measures: annual informal trilateral meetings 
with representatives of the social inspection services of the 
Netherlands, Belgium and Germany and informal meetings, at their 
request, with the German financial police (Finanzpolizei), who are 
competent for undeclared work, with the aim of exchanging information 
and possibly concluding an agreement on cooperation.  
 In general, Belgium promotes optimum use of the network of national 
contact points under Decision H5 and particularly the e-platform, which 
was set up at the request of the Administrative Commission. 
Bilateral agreements 
 With respect to family benefits, the competent institution (FAMIFED) 
notes that, in cases of fraud, the Brussels agreement on cross-border 
cooperation between local authorities and public bodies of 
16 September 2002 specifies the legal framework for such cooperation 
between France and Belgium for the purposes of cross-border 
cooperation on the family benefits system. The institutional 
organisation of the Kingdom of Belgium delegates its responsibilities to 
federated bodies, municipalities and regions, whilst in France they are 
shared between the State and the various levels of local authorities. 
However, it should be noted that, as far as the family benefit system is 
concerned, the exchange of information under the agreements for 
cross-border cooperation is virtually non-existent. The exchange of 
information with European public institutions does not function because 
of the communication difficulties encountered by our services when 
fraud is identified in files for social beneficiaries residing in Europe 
outside the Belgian territory or receiving various social allowances in 
Europe outside the Belgian territory.  
Bulgaria Actions: N/A 
Bilateral agreements:  
 Agreement concerning data exchange with Germany 
 Agreement concerning data exchange with the United Kingdom 
 Agreement concerning data exchange with the Netherlands 




 Bilateral agreement with Slovenia concerning electronic data exchange 
with respect to mortality information, rendering the use of life 
certificates redundant.  
Czech Republic Actions: N/A 
Bilateral agreements: 
 Agreements with Germany, France and the Netherlands concerning 
illegal work and the combating of misuse of social security benefits. 
These are rarely applied, however.  
Denmark Actions 
 Denmark is actively represented on the H5NCP Platform. 
 Denmark is represented in several working groups, such as the Nordic 
working group on Benefit Fraud and the Working Group on European 
Benefit Fraud.  
 Denmark has, as mentioned above, established a central unit for 
international administrative cooperation as well as a section on data 
and data matching under the auspices of Udbetaling Danmark. 
Moreover, Denmark is in the process of further strengthening the 
former initiative by establishing an international control unit focusing 
specifically on cooperation and control within the EU/EEA area.  
Bilateral agreements  
 Udbetaling Danmark has concluded a Memorandum of Understanding 
between Udbetaling Danmark and the Department for Work and 
Pensions and the Department for Social Development of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland concerning cooperation and mutual assistance in 
the administration of social security and social assistance programmes 
in October 2014. The declaration awaits implementation while the 
technical platform for exchange of data is decided. The agreement is 
intended to enhance cooperation on information exchange and is hence 
not intended solely to fight fraud and error. The agreement is in its 
current form limited to cooperation on administration of pension, but it 
is the mutual intention to extend the agreement to other areas. 
 Denmark is in the process of drawing up an agreement between Nordic 
institutions in Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and Denmark on 
cooperation and exchange of information via secure e-mail on social 
security and payment of benefits. The agreement is expected to be 
concluded in 2015. 
 A new Nordic Convention on social security entered into force on 1 May 
2014. The agreement contains among other things commitment to 
enhanced cooperation on electronic information exchange. 
Estonia  Actions: N/A 
Bilateral agreements 
 No de iure bilateral agreements have been established. 
 De facto cooperation meetings are held with the Finnish competent 
institutions every autumn where issues concerning fraud and error are 
discussed. 
Finland Actions: N/A 
Bilateral agreements 
 Cooperation with Estonia; meetings and negotiations in different 
branches of social security. 
 Secure e-mail connections with Estonia and Sweden. Negotiations for 
establishing secure e-mail connections with other Nordic pension 
institutions are ongoing.  
 Electronic exchange of insurance number data (E501) between Finland 
(the Finnish Centre for Pensions, ETK) and Sweden, Norway and 
Germany. The ETK submits the insurance numbers also to Kela, the 
social insurance institution of Finland. 
 Online access to German insurance history data (E505) and information 
on pension amounts from the ETK, employment pension institutions 
and Kela. 
 Unilateral exchange of insurance history (E505) from Norway and 
Sweden to Kela. 
 Based on bilateral agreements, Finland electronically exchanges: 
o life certificates between Finland (both ETK and Kela) and 
Sweden and Norway. 
 life certificates between Kela and Germany (Deutsche Post). The 
exchange of information on deaths with Germany and Spain are under 
negotiations. 
Germany  Actions: N/A 
Bilateral agreements  
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 Further progress in the testing of and preparation for the introduction 
of procedures for automated cross-checking of data on deaths with 
Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Greece, Croatia, Poland and the United 
Kingdom.  
Greece  Actions: N/A 
Bilateral agreements 
 The electronic exchange of data on deceased pensioners has been put 
into effect between social security bodies in Germany and Greece (IKA-
ETAM and OGA). 
The German pension institution and the Greek social security bodies (IKA-
ETAM, OGA and OAEE) share the possibility of automated access to the 
German E505 certificate concerning the insurance history of a worker and to 
information on pension amounts. 
Hungary Actions 
 Data exchanges with competent authorities.  
 Legal assistance and awareness raising amongst stakeholders. 
 Contacts with Member State representatives. 
Bilateral agreements: 
 Bilateral agreement with Austria and Slovakia (although these have not 
proven to be sustainable).  
Iceland Actions: 
 Establishment of the National Contact Point Platform based upon 
decision H5NCP. 
Bilateral/multilateral agreements 
 Nordic working group on benefit fraud, which holds yearly meetings.  
Ireland Actions: N/A 
Bilateral agreements 
 A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Government of 
Ireland and the Government of the United Kingdom and Northern 
Ireland concerning co-operation and mutual assistance in the 
administration of social security schemes was signed on 9 October 
2000. 
 Under the MOU, procedures have been implemented to ensure that all 
information requests and data exchanges are made through a single 
point of contact in each jurisdiction.   
 A Cross Border Operational Forum operates under the MOU. The Cross-
Border Operational Forum comprises of senior fraud managers from the 
Department of Social Protection, the Department for Work and Pensions 
(UK) and the Northern Ireland Social Security Agency of the 
Department for Social Development. The Forum’s remit is to liaise at 
operational level and ensure that measures are in place to ensure 
effective cooperation, prevention and detection of fraud. 
The forum continues to look at areas and opportunities for data exchanges. 
Italy Actions: N/A 
Bilateral agreements: 
 Agreement with Austria, Germany and Switzerland concerning data 
exchange 
Latvia Actions: N/A 
Bilateral agreements  
 Agreement between the State Social Insurance Fund Board of the 
Republic of Lithuania and the State Social Insurance Agency of the 
Republic of Latvia on electronic exchange of information on pension 
receivers (05.08.2011). Parties electronically exchange information on 
change of residence or the death of mutual pension receivers.  
 Arrangements have been made for the conclusion of an agreement 
between the National Social Insurance Board of the Republic of Estonia 
and the State Social Insurance Agency of the Republic of Latvia on the 
electronic exchange of information on pension receivers. It is planned 
that parties will electronically exchange information on change of 
residence or the death of mutual pension receivers. 
Lithuania  No new measures were taken in 2014. 
Malta Actions: N/A 
Bilateral agreements: 
 Data exchange agreement with the United Kingdom concluded in 2011.  
The Netherlands Actions:  
 .  
 Health care: participation in the International Association of Mutual 
Benefits and the European Healthcare Fraud and Corruption Network. 
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EHFCN’s activities aim to support members and associate entities in 
their work of prevention, detection, investigation, prosecution and 
redress of healthcare fraud, corruption and waste. 
 A national contact point for social security has been established.  
Bilateral agreements 
 Concerning posting, agreements have been concluded with Romania, 
Bulgaria and Poland.  
 Concerning the exchange of information with respect to deaths, 
agreements have been concluded with Belgium, Germany and France. 
Norway Actions 
 Establishment of a national contact point, operative since 2014. 
Bilateral agreements 
 Yearly meetings are held between the Nordic countries assessing the 
mutual adherence to the Nordic and European treaties in the field and 
addressing mutual challenges in combating fraud and error.  
Poland Actions (by the NCP network): 
 Obtaining information on entities entitled to verify a signature and life 
certificate in a given Member State. 
 Obtaining information on bilateral agreements entered into by EU/EFTA 
Member States, which provide for the aggregation of insurance periods 
completed in third countries. 
 Obtaining information included in agreements on the electronic 
exchange of information on beneficiaries’ deaths. 
 Obtaining and the exchange of information on contact 
persons/institutions competent to handle a particular case. 
 Obtaining information on national legislation concerning the retrieval of 
benefits from foreign bank accounts following the beneficiary’s death. 
Bilateral agreements  
 As regards ZUS: In order to avoid overpayment of benefits following 
the beneficiary’s death, actions have been taken in order to effect the 
electronic exchange of information on deaths. Currently, agreements 
have been signed with Germany, Australia (a project has been 
implemented) and Sweden. Currently, work is under way to facilitate 
electronic exchange of information with the Netherlands, the UK, Spain, 
Italy and Croatia.  
 As regards KRUS: In order to avoid overpayment of benefits following 
the beneficiary’s death, steps have been taken to implement the 
electronic exchange of information on the death of pensioners between 
KRUS and the German institution. 
Portugal Actions: N/A 
Bilateral agreements: 
 Bilateral agreement with Switzerland concerning disability and pension 
insurance. 
 Bilateral agreement with Ireland concerning marriages of convenience. 
 Bilateral agreement with the Netherlands concerning information-
sharing with respect to fraud and error.  
Romania Actions 
 According to the duties under the application of Decision H5, the CNPP, 
as a national contact point in combating fraud and error in the field of 
social security, via the Directorate for International Relations, has 
assigned two employees for solving the related requests. 
 Bilateral agreements: N/A 
Slovakia Actions: N/A 
Bilateral agreements 
 Information is exchanged with the Czech Republic concerning the 
administration of pensions. 
 A bilingual form has been developed in cooperation with the HMRC in 
the United Kingdom to facilitate information exchange. To prevent and 
detect fraud, bilateral working meetings are held with the institutions in 
neighbouring States (the Czech Republic, Hungary and Austria) to 
improve cooperation and information exchange in order to prevent 
fraud and error and to deal with cases of fraud and error. 
Spain Actions: N/A 
Bilateral agreements: 
 Bilateral negotiations are underway concerning collaboration 
agreements with liaison bodies of other Member States, in order to 
obtain information relating to pensioners of one State who reside in the 
other, with the objective of monitoring the proper implementation of 
the priority rules for benefits in kind set out in Article 25 of Regulation 
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(EC) No 883/04. 
 Spain and the United Kingdom have continued to make progress in the 
exchange of information relating to British citizens who are recognised 
as UK pensioners, but who are eligible for health care under Spanish 
legislation only because they are resident in Spain. 
 A collaboration agreement also exists between Spain and Germany for 
the electronic exchange of information on pensioners of both states. 
With the information provided by Germany, a process of cleaning this 
data has been initiated, with the aim of verifying cases of people whose 
health care should, under the priority rules, be funded by the country 
paying their pension, as they are currently eligible for health care under 
Spanish law only because they are resident in Spain. 
Sweden Actions 
 The Social Insurance Agency actively participates in seminars and other 
activities organised by the European Commission in this area. 
Bilateral agreements  
 An exchange of information between countries in the form of requests 
between them is therefore necessary to minimise the risk that the 
payment is made from two countries simultaneously. Cooperation with 
the relevant authorities in other Member States takes place primarily 
through the exchange of information on individual cases. For example, 
if a child lives abroad, the Social Insurance Agency sends a request to 
another Member State once a year to ensure that the right to the 
family benefit still exists.  
United Kingdom Actions: N/A 
Bilateral agreements  
 Ireland – Continued participation in the Cross Border Operational 
Forum with Ireland and Northern Ireland. Data matching continues on 
unreported deaths in the state pension caseload. 
 Spain – Data matching continues on unreported deaths in the state 
pension caseload. Officials from the UK visited Spain and held 
productive talks with Spanish officials on how to tackle cross-border 
fraud. A Memorandum of Understanding is currently being worked on 
which will allow greater data sharing on working age cases. 
 Germany – Talks have been held on progressing data matching on 
unreported deaths in the state pension caseload. Initial testing took 
place in spring 2015 with a view to full live running in autumn 2015. 
 Poland – Hosted a visit in London for Polish officials on progressing data 
matching on unreported deaths in the state pension caseload. Testing 
is to take place during 2015 with a view to full live running in early 
2016. 
 The Netherlands – Work continues to get data matching on state 
pension caseload live.  
 Malta – Data matching for unreported deaths was tested and became 
live in December 2014. 
 Denmark – Memorandum of Understanding signed in 2014. Work on-
going to get data matching live, target date autumn 2015. 
 Negotiations with France, Italy and Switzerland have been on-going 
during 2014 to agree and sign Memorandums of Understanding.  
 
4.2. Cross-border social security cooperation and privacy concerns  
4.2.1. General Findings  
In the large majority of Member States (AT, BE, BG, HR, CZ, DK, EE, FI, DE, IS, IT, 
LV, MT, NL, NO, PL, PT, RO, SK, SE) privacy and the protection and security of 
personal data is guaranteed by both international as well as national legal provisions. In 
particular the foregoing refers to the applicable EU provisions pertaining to the protection 
of data, but equally so national safeguards that have been implemented in this respect.  
In addition and noteworthy, Belgium, Finland and Latvia have concluded bilateral 
and/or multilateral agreements with other States concerning the protection of such data 
and privacy. Furthermore, a measure worth mentioning is the encryption of data as done 
by the Czech Republic, Germany, Ireland and Latvia as a means to safeguard privacy 
and data whilst nevertheless complying with the coordination provisions.  
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4.2.2. Overview of Member State-specific action  
In what follows a short overview is provided of the noteworthy individual Member State 
initiatives as concerns the protection of data and privacy in the field of social security 
coordination.  
In Belgium, as regards family benefits, the competent institution (FAMIFED) notes that 
information is exchanged in compliance with Article 76 (4) of Regulation (EC) No 
883/2004. This Article stipulates that the institutions and persons covered by the 
Regulation have a duty of mutual information and cooperation to ensure the correct 
implementation thereof. Article 77 refers to compliance with the legislation on data 
protection in the Member State, which provided the data and in the Member State 
receiving the data in compliance with EU rules on the protection of natural persons with 
regard to the processing and free movement of personal data. Concerning unemployment 
insurance, the competent institution indicates that the Belgian legislation covering ONEM 
applies to the members of its staff. The Belgian legislation concerned is: the Royal 
Decree of 2 October 1937 on the status of officials of the state amended by Royal Decree 
of 26 September 1994 reforming various regulatory provisions applicable to state 
officials; the Act of 15 January 1990 on the institution and organisation of the Crossroads 
Bank for Social Security (CBSS),10 hereinafter the CBSS Act; the Act of 8 December 1992 
on the protection of privacy with regard to processing personal data,11 hereinafter the Act 
on privacy; and the Act of 11 April 1994 on government information.12 In addition, 
Belgium has concluded a treaty with the Netherlands on the development of cooperation 
and administrative assistance on social security (28 February 2013) as well as an 
agreement with the French Republic for the development of cooperation and 
administrative assistance on social security (17 November 2008). Finally, there have 
been authorisations by the Sectoral Committee on Social Security and Health with 
respect to the exchange of personal data. In particular, this concerns the authorisation of 
the Sectoral Committee on Social Security and Health, ‘social security’ section, on the 
exchange of personal data between the NEO and the UWV (Uitvoeringsinstituut 
Werknemersverzekeringen – Netherlands) obtained on 7 May 2013, and the authorisation 
of the Sectoral Committee on Social Security and Health, ‘social security’ section, on the 
exchange of personal data between the NEO and Pôle Emploi (France), obtained on 7 July 
2013.13 
In Denmark, in cases of cross-border cooperation and information exchange, the privacy 
and protection of personal data is guaranteed by adhering to relevant national legislative 
provisions in both countries as well as relevant EU provisions, e.g. Directive 95/46/EC on 
the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the 
free movement of such data. Additionally, personal data protection is guaranteed by 
securing the technical platform for information exchange, which the data protection 
provisions prescribe. 
Similarly, whilst implementing Regulation (EC) No 883/2004, the insured person’s 
personal data is processed in accordance with the Estonian Data Protection Act. There 
are certain restrictions concerning access to and the processing of personal data in EHIF. 
                                                 
10 Belgian Official Journal of 22 February 1990. 
11 Belgian Official Journal of 18 March 1993. 
12 Belgian Official Journal of 30 July 1994. 
13 In the light of the recent BARA judgment, the legal status of such bilateral cooperation agreements, which 
even before said judgement according to some was unclear, has now become even more uncertain. The same 
goes for many other types of cooperation involving the exchange of personal information discussed in the 
national reports, all of which were drafted before the Court of Justice's judgement in the BARA case. The impact 




Access to the information concerned is limited to specialists who are engaged in dealing 
with e-forms and the implementation of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 and only insofar 
the data is effectively required in order to complete their tasks. 
To safeguard the protection of personal data, Finland – as has been done in Belgium – 
has concluded a bilateral agreement with Norway and Sweden on data exchange 
management according to Decision 117/82. Insofar the exchange of information is 
possible according to both countries’ legislation on data protection, an agreement can be 
made on it between two or more countries. The provisions in Regulation (EC) No 
883/2004 (especially Article 76) also support the exchange of this information on a case-
by-case basis if the information is needed when implementing the Regulations in 
practise. Furthermore, data matching in the pensions sector concerning the exchange of 
PINs and insurance periods is directly derived from Regulation (EC) No 987/2009. 
Additional provisions concerning the exchange have been agreed upon in the agreements 
with Sweden, Norway and Germany.  
In Germany, for social security purposes, §77 SGB X in conjunction with Regulations 
(EC) No 883/2004 and No 987/2009 (or their respective predecessors) forms the general 
legal basis for the transmission of social security data to foreign bodies. Data may be 
transmitted only to the extent necessary to enable German social security institutions or 
foreign authorities to perform their statutory tasks, and provided that doing so does not 
contravene the principles in Article 6 TEU. The IT security objectives of the German 
Social Security Code are very closely aligned with the security objectives of the EU Data 
Protection Directive (Article 17 of Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC). In particular, 
electronic data transfer occurs using SSL encryption and – provided the foreign 
institution has the technological capabilities – via the sTesta network. Wherever possible, 
data to be exchanged is, additionally, pgp or pkcs#7-encrypted. It need be noted, 
however, that the data protection rules under national law vary widely from one Member 
State to another. Lastly, for the purposes of the German child benefit under the Income 
Tax Act, §30 of the Fiscal Code (Tax secrecy) in conjunction with the Regulations forms 
the legal basis for the transmission of child benefit data to foreign institutions responsible 
for family benefits. Under this provision, child benefit data may only be disclosed if this 
serves the implementation of child benefit tax procedures/proceedings, if it is expressly 
permitted by law, in cases of compelling public interest, or if the person concerned gives 
his or her consent. 
In Iceland data processing is protected by Act No 77/2000 on the Protection of Privacy.  
As is the case in Germany, in Ireland robust procedures and practices are in place for 
the secure transmission of sensitive data to other bodies. One of the methods employed 
to safeguard the protection of personal data is via the encryption thereof.  
Italy also guarantees privacy rights and protects data by reference to national and 
international legislation. Claimants are informed on how their respective data will be 
handled. Furthermore, data exchange is solely permitted insofar the parties have given 
consent for such exchange. Lastly, timely notifications are obliged in case of 
malfunctions, defects, or other irregularities pertaining to the confidentiality of data.  
In Latvia, privacy and the protection and security of personal data on a national level is 
guaranteed according to the Personal Data Protection Law. Furthermore, there are 
various provisions as such in all international agreements on social security between 
Latvia and third countries (Australia, Belarus, Canada, the Russian Federation and 
Ukraine). Lastly, in the exchange of data between Latvia and Lithuania, it need be noted 
that the data is also encrypted – as is the case in Germany and Ireland.  
In Lithuania, the protection and security of personal data within the context of social 
security coordination is ensured by the Law on Legal Protection of Personal Data. In 
addition, data exchanges are subject to the privacy provisions in the relevant European 
instruments. Again, these same forms of protection are accorded in Norway, by the Act 
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of 14 April 2000 No 31 relating to the processing of personal data (Personal Data Act), 
which implemented Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data.14 In addition, 
section 7 of the Act of the Norwegian Labour and Welfare Administration regulates the 
duty of confidentiality. In Poland, data processing is also protected by detailed 
provisions, including the Personal Data Protection Act of 29 August 1997 (Journal of Laws 
of 2014, item 1182 as amended) and the Classified Information Protection Act of 5 
August 2010 (Journal of Laws of 2010, No 182, item 1228 as amended), as well as the 
European relevant provisions.  
In Malta reference is made to the bilateral agreement between Malta and the United 
Kingdom, which was drafted in conformity with EU Directive 95/46/EC and the Data 
Protection Act.  
Data processing and privacy concerns in Portugal are dealt with by the National 
Personal Data Protection Act (Act No 67/98), which lays down the basic and general 
regulations in this respect.  
In Croatia, Romania and Slovakia reference is made to the national acts and 
instruments that govern the protection of data processing. Similarly, as concerns Spain 
two national acts are worth mentioning which govern the protection of data pursuant to 
data processing. Firstly, Article 66(1) of the General Law on Social Security provides that 
data obtained in connection with social security administration must be confidential and 
must not be given or communicated to third parties, except as permitted by the Law. 
Secondly, Organic Law 15/1999 of 13 December 1999 on the Protection of Personal Data 
is designed to guarantee and protect – in the area of the handling of personal data – 
public freedoms and the fundamental rights of natural persons, and especially their 
honour and personal and family privacy. 
4.3. Assessing potential conflicts vis-à-vis privacy legislation15 
Mindful of the foregoing, a number of Member States (AT, BG, HR, CZ, EE, DE, HU, IS, 
IT, LV, LT, MT, NL, NO, PT, RO, SK, SE) have noted that no conflict is considered to 
exist in view of the coordination rules vis-à-vis the EU privacy and data protection 
legislation. As noted by Italy, however, the necessary cooperation required to combat 
fraud and error in the realm of social security coordination does flirt with potential 
privacy concerns. Consequently, it is not inconceivable that several other Member States 
(BE, DK, FI, EL, IE, PL, ES) make note of the fact that issues as such may in fact arise 
due to the discrepancies between the two fields of legislation. Iceland notes that privacy 
legislation hinders the cooperation between competent authorities, thus taking into 
consideration the opposing perspective not focused on the privacy concerns of the 
claimant.  
In Belgium for example, the competent institutions in the field of unemployment 
insurance consider it to be a concern. If, depending on the administrative and 
judicial/criminal nature of the investigation, various European provisions on privacy and 
data protection apply to the inspection services and the competent 
institutions/authorities, the investigators in the field find themselves in a difficult 
position. Whilst the investigation may be criminal in nature (but only in the requesting 
Member State), a request for cooperation is frequently confined to an administrative 
request to the competent administration in the Member State to which the request is 
directed. The competent foreign administrations may also be forced to comply with 
stricter national regulations on privacy because they do not have investigatory powers 
                                                 
14 OJ L 281, 23.11.1995, p. 31–50. 
15 As mentioned before, the national reports were received before the BARA judgement and said judgement has 
not been taken into account during the writing of this report. 
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and, most of the time, depend on sincere cooperation on the part of the public and 
employers. Concerning family benefits, the competent institution (FAMIFED) emphasises 
that when domestic Belgian legislation on privacy is so strict as to make it necessary to 
obtain an explicit authorisation for the communication of personal data to a third party, 
there is in fact a conflict.  
Denmark considers the need for a system of safe communication between the Member 
States to be the most substantial challenge in relation to EU privacy and data protection 
provisions and cross-border cooperation and information exchange. It is hoped that this 
problem will be solved with the implementation of the EESSI system. Within this context, 
Finland and Greece note that one of the problems with cross-border cooperation and 
information exchange is that the Regulations on the coordination of social security do not 
contain provisions on data matching. Ireland, Poland and Spain echo these concerns.  
Within this context, the majority of Member States (DK, EE, DE, EL, LV, LT, NO, PL, 
RO, SK, ES) have yet to put forward suggestions to resolve said issues. Belgium on the 
other hand notes that concerning unemployment insurance, the social inspection services 
indicate that a system enabling cross-border information exchange between inspection 
services could be set up to cover all cross-border exchange of information relating to the 
rules on coordination and in particular those on determining the applicable legislation. As 
regards family benefits, the competent institution (FAMIFED) notes that it might be a 
solution to clarify the authorisation system. Finland furthermore specifies that specific 
provisions taking account of the importance of cross-border cooperation and information 
exchange could provide a sound legal basis for the institutions in questions to rely on. In 
addition, attempts should be made to draft provisions on a European level to govern data 
matching. Lastly, Ireland notes that financial service providers and public sector 
investigative agencies who are currently working to prevent fraud and reduce fraud 
losses could jointly share specific data from a financial and crime prevention perspective, 
which is currently restricted under the existing data protection legislation. 
Belgium notes that regarding the applicable legislation the social inspection services 
indicate that a system enabling cross-border information exchange between inspection 
services could be set up to cover all cross-border exchanges of information relating to the 
rules on coordination and in particular those on determining the applicable legislation. As 
regards family benefits, the competent institution (FAMIFED) notes that it might be a 
solution to clarify the authorisation system. Finland notes that specific provisions that 
would take into account the importance of cross-border cooperation and information 
exchange would provide a sound legal basis for the institutions in questions to rely on. 
Moreover, Finland notes that the provisions on a European level for data matching would 
prove beneficial in combating fraud and error. Ireland notes that financial service 
providers and public sector investigative agencies who are currently working to prevent 
fraud and reduce fraud losses should jointly share specific data from a financial and crime 
prevention perspective, which is currently restricted under the existing data protection 
legislation, in an attempt to enhance the fight against fraud and error in the field of social 
security coordination. Finally, the Netherlands notes that any issues that may arise with 
respect to data protection whilst implementing the coordination rules may be prevented 
or resolved by (increased) use of bilateral agreements.16  
Data exchange and Data Protection Member States 
Not perceived as conflicting 
AT, BG, HR, CZ, EE, DE, HU, IS, IT, LV, LT, MT, NL, 
NO, PT, RO, SK, SE 
                                                 
16 Whether or not this is correct remains subject of debate for various reasons. It is clear from this report that 
the number and variety of bilateral agreements regarding the exchange of personal data in the field of social 
security pose problems in the light of ground principles of the applicable rules and regulations regarding privacy 
and data protection (e.g. the principle of foreseeability and more specifically the criterion of purpose limitation). 
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5. CONCLUSION  
Similarly to last years’ findings, the Member States have reported a diverse plethora of 
measures undertaken – with varying intensity - in order to combat fraud and error within 
the respective territories. Notwithstanding these discrepancies and differences amongst 
Member States as concerns fraud and error however, these measures are nevertheless 
demonstrative of the continued willingness of the respective States to combat these 
practices, as was the case in 2014.17 Mindful of the foregoing, the following conclusions 
can be drawn.  
 
The different approaches undertaken by various Member States in combating fraud and 
error may – in part – be attributed to the fact that the sources delineating what 
constitutes fraud and error in social security coordination vary significantly across 
Member States. Whilst in some Member States such definitions are tailored to specific 
social security branches, other Member States make use of generally applicable 
administrative and criminal law for the determination thereof. Not inconceivably, this 
entails that certain Member States are more focused and aware of the specificity of fraud 
and error in social security coordination, whilst others are possibly less confronted with 
such issues, as a result of which less focus is given thereto. Consequently, this could also 
affect the intensity with which fraud and error are dealt with.  
 
As concerns the prevalence of fraud and error as two conceptually distinct phenomena a 
number of observations are in order. The entirety of the Member State reports were 
telling in this respect – the data concerning the prevalence of fraud and error is 
extremely fragmented and inconclusive. Due to the unsystematic approach to data 
collection amongst Member States, no pertinent and conclusive comparisons can be 
made. It suffices to note in this respect, that certain Member States have collected 
substantial data in the field of family benefits, whilst others have collected data with 
respect to unemployment benefits. As previously indicated, the unsystematic approach to 
data collection in this field may be attributed to a number of factors. This includes, 
amongst others, the fact that various authorities are competent for varying social 
security branches – whilst some of such authorities may find it useful to collect such 
data, others simply do not. Moreover, as indicated on a number of occasions, certain 
Member States simply do not make the distinction between fraud and error as two 
distinct concepts, whilst others do not collect data with respect to social security fraud 
and error exclusively in relation to coordination matters. Due to these obstacles in the 
field of data collection, it is extremely difficult to make telling comparisons concerning 
the prevalence fraud and error in this particular field across Member States, which 
furthermore renders it difficult to assess the magnitude of the phenomena.  
 
Notwithstanding the ambiguity as to the prevalence of fraud and error in social security 
coordination, Member States have nevertheless become increasingly aware of the 
potential thereof and thus have taken to initiatives – similarly to last year - aimed at both 
preventing and curbing fraud and error in social security.  It need be noted however, that 
these initiatives are not limited to a national context only, and thus are also aimed at 
fraud and error in a cross-border context. Within this context, three large trends are 
ascertainable in conjunction with Member State-specific initiatives. Firstly, an increased 
use of data exchange, data matching and data mining is noticeable. In addition thereto, 
much focus has been shifted to the combatting of fraud and particularly error in the field 
of pensions and the exchange of mortality information. Finally, increased use is being 
made of bilateral agreements – indicated as a recommendation in last years’ findings.  
 
                                                 
17 Dismayingly, it need be noted that these findings can however, only be compared to foregoing studies in a 
highly limited manner, as the focal points of foregoing studies do not necessarily correspond with the focal point 
of the current report.  
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Notwithstanding the undertaken national initiatives however, the application of the 
coordination provisions remains somewhat problematic. In particular, a number of 
overarching and persistent issues have been identified by the national Member State 
reports. These issues include, amongst others, and not in the least, the lack of 
information exchange between authorities on a national and on an international scale. 
This is further aggravated by the lacking awareness of rights and obligations in a cross-
border context from the perspective of employers as well as benefit claimants. Lastly, 
note has been made of the increasing difficulty concerning the determination of 
residence, which has been facilitated by increasingly mobile citizens. In countering these 
particular issues, three types of initiatives have been identified, in addition to other 
Member State specific arrangement: awareness raising of the claimant, awareness 
raising of the providers and bilateral agreements.  
 
Finally, as concerns the recourse to increased data exchange as a requisite means to 
combat fraud and error, mention need be made of the data protection concerns that may 
arise as a result thereof. The majority of Member States concerned are of the opinion 
that the current frameworks governing the exchange of information as a means to 
combat fraud and error in the field of social security coordination, are sufficiently 
protective and in conformity with applicable data protection legislation. However, if this is 
correct remains subject of debate and further research on this topic is highly 
recommended since more and more personal information is exchanged between different 
actors in different Member States and more and more cases depend on said cross-border 
and often interdisciplinary exchange of information.18 
 
In view of the foregoing, it appears that one of the most fundamental steps that needs to 
be taken, concerns the facilitating of inter and intra-state information exchange with due 
regard for data protection concerns. As indicated at the beginning of the report, the lack 
of cooperation in this respect singlehandedly functions as a gateway to a number of 
issues amongst Member States in the field of social security coordination, including 
amongst others, double insurance, erroneous payments of pensions and lacking certainty 
as concerns residency.  Consequently, this appears to be a requisite first step in any 
further action concerning fraud and error in the context of social security coordination. In 
this respect, the United Kingdom is of the opinion that "EESSI has the potential to 
significantly improve the flow of data exchanges, to the great advantage of the fight 
against fraud and error".  
 
 
   
                                                 
18 The foregoing is even more pertinent after the recent judgement of the Court of Justice on a case of national 
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19 Please note that the data does not specifically and exclusively illustrate cases of fraud and error in relation to coordination of social security under Regulat ion (EC) No 
883/2004, as these cases are not registered separately. Note, moreover, that cases of fraud and cases of error are generally not registered separately. The requested data is 
registered in the appendix under “fraud”, but may constitute cases of error as well. It is, lastly, not possible to provide data on each type of error specifically. 
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Death grants           
Unemployment 
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Pre-retirement 
benefits 
          









Overview Sanctioning Fraud: Austria 
Legal provision Title Penalty 
Scope of practical 
application 
§ 153c StGB20 Non-payment of 
employees' social security 
contributions 
Imprisonment of up to 2 
years 
Evasion of employees' 
social security 
contributions by an 
employer 
§ 153c StGB Fraudulent non-payment 
of social security 
contributions and 
supplements pursuant to 
the Act on leave and 
severance pay for 
construction workers 
Basic penalty of up to 3 
years; qualified penalty 
of 6 months to 5 years 
Evasion of social security 
contributions, if the 
employees are registered 
with social security and 
the intention at the date 
of registration was to 
underpay the 
contributions; in practice 
usually applies to the 
registration of employees 
of a front company 
§ 153e StGB Organised undeclared 
work 
Imprisonment of up to 
two years 
Placing, providing, 
recruiting or employing 
illegal workers (i.e. 
employed workers not 
registered with social 
security or self-employed 
workers without the 
necessary business 
licence); active 
involvement in the 
operation of a large group 
of illegal workers 
§ 146 StGB Fraud Imprisonment of up to 6 
months or a fine of up to 
360 daily amounts 
Causing financial loss 
through deception; 
applicable to contribution 
evasion through 
deception and to 
intentionally fraudulent 
claiming of social security 
benefits 
§ 147 StGB Serious fraud Imprisonment of up to 3 
years; qualified penalty: 
imprisonment of 1 to 10 
years 
As above under § 146 
StGB; mainly applicable 
to cases of falsification or 
if the damage exceeds 
€3,000; application of the 





                                                 




Overview Sanctioning Fraud: Belgium21  
 Imprisonment Criminal fine* Administrative fine* 
Level 1 penalty   €55 to €550 
Level 2 penalty  either a criminal fine 
between €275 and 
€2,750 
or an administrative fine 
between €137.50 and 
€1,375 
Level 3 penalty  either a criminal fine 
between €550 and 
€5,550 
or an administrative fine 
between €275 and €2,750 
Level 4 penalty either imprisonment 
between six months and 
three years 
and/or a criminal fine 
between €3,300 and € 
33,000 
or an administrative fine 
between €1,650 and 
€16,500 
 
                                                 
21 The introduction of the Social Criminal Code in Belgian legislation can be called a best practice. Before its 
introduction, sanctions were scattered throughout the various acts and regulations that constitute Belgian 
social law. Moreover, as a the result of various legislative intiatives throughout the years and the lack of any 
coordination whatsoever, the levels of sanctions varied without any meaningful logic. The Belgian Social 
Criminal Code coordinates all infringements, harmonizes the levels of sanctions and decriminalises the 
infringements punished by a level 1 sanction, which is since then purely administrative. Furthermore, the 
Belgian Social Criminal Code clarifies the relation between the criminal and administrative enforcement of 
infringements as well as the relations between and the competences of the different actors involved. The 
original text of article 101 on the sanction levels read:  
"Art. 101 The sanction levels 
The infringements as provided for in Book 2 shall be punished with a level 1, a level 2, a level 3 or a level 4 
sanction.  
The level 1 sanction shall be an administrative fine between 10 and 100euros. 
The level 2 sanction shall either be a criminal fine between 50 and 500euros, or an administrative fine between 
25 and 250 euros. 
The level 3 sanction shall either be a criminal fine between 100 and 1000euros, or an administrative fine between 
50 and 500 euros. 
The level 4 sanction shall either be a prison sentence between six months and three years and a criminal fine 
between 600 and 6000euros, or only one of these sanctions, or an administrative fine between 300 and 
3000euros". 
(cfr. De Coninck M., Gillis D. & Jorens Y., The Belgian Social Criminal Code. An English Translation by 
IRIS|international research institute on social fraud, Die Keure, Brugge, 2013) 
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 Criminal penalties (Social Criminal Code) 
Unjustified affiliation 
with a foreign social 
security system (with, 




Article 223. Forwarding of documents to institutions by employers 
§ 1. Level 2 penalties are imposed on: 
1. employers, their deputies or their authorised representatives who do not forward to 
the National Social Security Office a declaration providing evidence of the amount of 
social security contributions due under the Law of 27 June 1969 revising the Decree-
Law of 28 December 1944 concerning social security for workers; 
[…] 
When acts are committed knowingly and deliberately a level 3 penalty is imposed. 
For infringements under paragraph 1, the fine is multiplied by the number of workers 
concerned. 
Fictitious affiliation in 
Belgium (affiliation in 
order to obtain benefits 
without services actually 
being provided) 
Article 221. Fraudulent affiliation 
A level 4 penalty is imposed on employers, their deputies or authorised 
representatives who: 
1. fraudulently subject one or more persons to application of the Law of 27 June 1969 
revising the Decree-Law of 28 December 1944 concerning social security for workers; 
2. fraudulently subject one or more persons to application of the Decree-Law of 
7 February 1945 concerning the social security of sailors in the merchant navy. 
For the infringements under paragraph 1, the fine is multiplied by the number of 
workers concerned. 
The judge may also impose the penalties provided for by Articles 106 and 107. 
Fraud, forgery and 
deception (false 
declarations, use of false 
identity cards or false A1 
documents, etc.) 
 
Article 232. Fraud and the use of forgery under social criminal law 
A level 4 penalty is imposed on anybody who, in order to obtain or have obtained, or 
to keep or have kept an undue social advantage, or not to pay contributions or not to 
have them paid, or to pay less or to have less paid than is required by that person or 
the other party: 
1. a) has committed a forgery, either by false signatures or by counterfeiting or 
alteration of the written word or signatures or by fabricating agreements, provisions, 
obligations or discharges or by inserting them in a document either by adding or 
altering clauses, declarations or facts which that document was intended to 
incorporate or record; 
b) has committed forgery or falsified a document; 
[…] 
Article 233. Inaccurate or incomplete declarations concerning social advantages 
§ 1. A level 4 penalty is imposed on anybody who knowingly and deliberately: 
1. makes an inaccurate or incomplete declaration to obtain or have obtained, keep or 
have kept an undue social advantage; 
2. has omitted or refused to make a declaration which they are obliged to make or to 
provide information they are obliged to supply, to obtain or have obtained, keep or 
have kept an undue social advantage; 
3. received a social advantage to which they were not entitled or were only partially 
entitled following a declaration referred to in paragraph 1.1, an omission or a refusal 
to make a declaration or to provide information referred to in paragraph 1.2 or an 
action referred to in Articles 232 and 235. 
When the infringements referred to in paragraph 1 are committed by employers, their 
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deputies or their authorised representatives to obtain or have obtained a social 
advantage to which the worker is not entitled, the fine is multiplied by the number of 
workers concerned. 
§ 2. A level 3 penalty is imposed on anybody who knowingly and deliberately fails to 
declare that they are no longer entitled to a social advantage, if only in part, in order 
to keep an undue social advantage. 
Article 234. Inaccurate or incomplete declarations concerning contributions 
§ 1. A level 4 penalty is imposed on anyone who knowingly and deliberately: 
1. makes an inaccurate or incomplete declaration in order not to pay or have paid 
contributions, to pay less or have paid less than those they or other parties are 
required to pay; 
2. fails or refuses to make a declaration which they are obliged to make or to provide 
information they are obliged to give in order not to pay or have paid contributions, or 
to pay less or have less paid than those which they or the other party are required to 
pay; 
3. pays fewer contributions than those they are required to pay or does not pay them 
following a declaration referred to in 1, failure or refusal to make a declaration or to 
provide information referred to under 2 or an act covered by Articles 232 and 235. 
Where the infringements referred to in paragraph 1 are committed by employers, 
their deputies or their authorised representatives the fine is multiplied by the number 
of workers concerned. 
§ 2. A level 3 penalty is imposed on anybody who knowingly and deliberately fails to 
declare that they are no longer entitled to a dispensation from or reduction of 
contributions, even if only in part, in order not to pay contributions or to pay less than 
they are required to pay. 
Article 235. Deception under social criminal law 
A level 4 penalty is imposed on anyone who, in order to obtain or have obtained, keep 
or have kept an undue social advantage or not to pay contributions or not have them 
paid, to pay less or have less paid than those which they or the third party is required 
to pay, has made use of false names, false titles or false addresses or has used any 
other fraudulent act to mislead people into believing in the existence of a false person, 
a false enterprise, a fictitious accident or any other fictitious event or to abuse trust in 
any other manner. 
Where the infringement referred to in paragraph 1 is committed by employers, their 
deputies or authorised representatives to have obtained or have kept a social 
advantage to which the workers are not entitled, the fine is multiplied by the number 





 Civil penalties (Royal Decree of 28/11/1969) 
Unjustified affiliation with 
a foreign social security 
system (with, as the case 
may be, a fictitious 
registered office abroad) 
 
Article 54ter. 
§ 1. Without prejudice to the civil penalties provided for under Articles 54 and 
54bis, in the absence of a declaration or in the case of an incomplete or inaccurate 
declaration, employers or trustees are debited a flat rate of 50 euros and a rate of 
4 euros per line or missing occupation for which the remuneration to be 
considered is amended, if the civil servants referred to in Article 31 of the Law or 
the internal departments of the Office have to draw up or rectify the three-
monthly declaration. […] 
§ 2. Failure to submit to the National Social Security Office, by the deadline laid 
down in Article 33 or Article 35bis, the three monthly declaration and the annexes 
required will result in employers or the trustees being debited a flat rate of 495.79 
euros and 247.89 euros for each tranche of 24 789.35 euros of contributions over 
and above 49 578.70 euros. 
Fictitious affiliation in 
Belgium (affiliation in 
order to obtain benefits 
without services actually 
being provided) 
 
Deregistration without any civil penalties involving the NSSO (but intervention of 
other IPSS (Institutions publiques de sécurité sociale – Public social security 
institutions) for the unduly paid allowances) 
Unjustified affiliation in 
Belgium 
 
Deregistration without any civil penalties involving the NSSO (but intervention of 
other IPSS for the unduly paid allowances) 
 
Overview Sanctioning Fraud: Portugal 
Administrative Offences Minor  Serious  Very Serious 
False declarations      X 
Failure to declare the termination or suspension of 
and changes to the nature of the work contract  
X     
Failure to report or delay in reporting recruitment of 
workers  
X X  X 
Omission of mandatory communications concerning 
the employer – changes to identifying details, 
including those relative to the establishment, start, 
suspension or termination of activity  
X X   
Failure to deliver or delay in delivering declaration of 
remuneration  
X X  
Failure to include the worker in the declaration of 
remuneration  
   X 
Omission of any other element that should be 
included in the declaration of remuneration pursuant 
to the regulation  
X   
Failure to provide evidence of elements requested 
from self-employed workers  
X X   
Failure to declare total value of sales made and the 
value of the services provided within the prescribed 
time  
X X   
Failure to pay or delay in paying contributions by 
employers, self-employed persons or contracting 
bodies  
X X   
Drawing benefits while engaging in paid activity in 
breach of the specific legal provisions 
    X 
Failure to submit declaration or other legally 
required documents where no specific punishment is 
provided for  











Amount of the fines 
 
Natural person 
Legal person with: 
Fewer than 50 
employees 
50 employees or 
more 
Minor Negligence € 50 to 250 € 75 to 375 € 100 to 500 
Fraud € 100 to 500 € 150 to 750 € 200 to 1 000 
Serious Negligence € 300 to 1 200 € 450 to 1 800 € 600 to 2 400 
Fraud € 600 to 2 400 € 900 to 3 600 € 1 200 to 4 800 
Very serious Negligence € 1 250 to 6 250 € 1 875 to 9 375 € 2 500 to 12 500 
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